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BARRY CUSHMAN
DOCTRINAL SYNERGIES AND LIBERAL
DILEMMAS: THE CASE OF THE
YELLOW-DOG CONTRACT
The three decades spanning the years 1908 to 1937 saw a remark-
able transformation of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence concern-
ing the rights of workers to organize. In 1908, the court held that
a federal law prohibiting employers from discharging an employee
because of his membership in a labor union violated the liberty of
contract secured to the employer by the Fifth Amendment.1 In
1915, the Court similarly declared a state statute prohibiting the
use of "yellow-dog" contracts unconstitutional.2 In 1937, by con-
trast, the Court upheld provisions of the Wagner Act prohibiting
both discharges for union membership and the use of yellow-dog
contracts. 3 Thus, the doctrine of "liberty of contract" no longer
operated as a bar to legislation protecting the rights of workers to
organize for purposes of collective bargaining.
Barry Cushman is Assistant Professor of Law, St. Louis University School of Law.
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Remarkably, the intellectual history of this transformation has
not been written. Historians writing about the Wagner Act cases,
preoccupied by the more dramatic commerce clause issues, have
tended to give only cursory treatment to the due process dimen-
sions of the decisions.4 The outcome of the cases has been seen as
an essentially political response to the external political pressure
brought to bear by the Court-packing plan and the 1936 election.
s
This explanation has apparently been seen as obviating any sus-
tained conceptual or doctrinal analysis.
6
The tale of the yellow-dog contract is naturally of interest be-
cause of its centrality to the development of American labor law
and the decline of substantive due process. Beyond this, however,
the story can be seen as a critical chapter in the development of
American liberal legalism. The yellow-dog contract provoked
something of a crisis in liberal discourse, because it brought into
conflict two time-honored liberal values: liberty of contract and
freedom of association. Recent scholarship has shown how "liberty
of contract" was forged from such diverse liberal resources as Adam
Smith's liberal political economy, Jacksonian liberalism, and the
Northern "free labor" ideology that animated the abolitionist move-
ment.7 Freedom of association enjoyed no less venerable liberal
4 See, e.g., Peter Irons, The New Deal Lawyers 287-88 (Princeton Univ, 1982); Kelly &
Harbison, The American Constitution: Its Origins and Development 766-77 (Norton, 4th ed
1970); Mason & Beaney, The Supreme Court in a Free Society 182-84 (Norton, 1968); Robert
McCloskey, The American Supreme Court 176 (Univ of Chicago, 1960); Paul Murphy, The
Constitution in Crisis Times, 1918-1969, 157-58 (Harper & Row, 1972); Fred Rodell, Nine
Men 249-250 (Vintage, 1955); Bernard Schwartz, The Supreme Court: Constitutional Revolution
in Retrospect 21-22, 34-36 (Ronald Press, 1957); William Swindler, 2 Court and Constitution in
the Twentieth Century: The New Legality, 1932-1968, 99-100 (Bobbs-Merrill, 1968); Benjamin
Wright, The Growth of American Constitutional Law 204-5 (H Holt, 1942).
' See, e.g., Edward Corwin, Court Over Constitution 127 (Princeton Univ, 1938); Robert
McCloskey, supra at 224; Paul Murphy, supra at 115; Walter Murphy, Congress and the
Court: A Case Study in the American Political Process 65 (Univ of Chicago, 1962); William
Swindler, supra at 81; Benjamin F. Wright, The Growth of American Constitutional Law 205,
222 (Univ of Chicago, 1967).
6 For a critique of the political response theory, see Cushman, "Rethinking the New Deal
Court: The "Switcb-in-Time" Reconsidered (forthcoming); Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional
Fact/Constitutional Fiction, 44 Stan L Rev 759, 771 n 76, 774-75 n .98 (1992).
' See Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party Before
the Civil War (Oxford Univ, 1970); William Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and
the Law in the Gilded Age, 1985 Wis L Rev 767, 772-800 (1985); Charles McCurdy, The Roots
of "Liberty of Contract" Reconsidered: Major Premises in the Law of Employment, 1867-1937, in
1984 Yearbook of the Supreme Court Historical Society 20 (1984); William Nelson, The Impact of
the Antislavery Movement upon Styles ofJudicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 Harv
L Rev 513 (1974).
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pedigree. Its protection against government infringement en-
shrined in the First Amendment,8 the freedom to affiliate with the
lawful organizations of one's choice, had been a widely embraced
feature of American culture since well before the Civil War. 9 In-
deed, the passion of the American people for voluntary associations
had attracted the fascination of Alexis de Tocqueville during his
journey to the United States in the 1830s.
10
The yellow-dog contract exposed a tension between these two
values of American liberalism. Opponents of the yellow-dog con-
tract contended that the employer was using his constitutionally
protected liberty of contract as a means to inhibit his employee's
freedom to associate with his fellow workingmen. In characteristi-
cally liberal terms, the answer to this charge would turn on
whether the employee was seen as having surrendered his freedom
of association voluntarily, or as a product of coercion. The answer
to this question would in turn depend upon assumptions about the
structure of the labor market-assumptions that would change over
time. Beneath this discourse, I believe, lay concerns about whether
labor unions were properly analogized to the other sorts of volun-
tary associations celebrated by American liberalism. As those con-
cerns became increasingly allayed over time, labor's advocates
could more successfully appropriate the liberal rhetoric of.associa-
tional freedom.
Yet the story of the yellow dog's demise cannot be adequately
understood by looking at cultural context alone. In order to under-
stand the voting patterns of the various Justices and the views they
expressed in their opinions, one must pay close attention to the
development of doctrine. A study of the doctrine pertaining to the
yellow-dog contract reveals to us the poverty of the notion that
substantive due process and dual federalism were merely conve-
nient weapons in the arsenal of a reactionary Court devoted to the
maintenance of financial and industrial elites." Instead, we may
see the weblike, interconnected structure of laissez-faire constitu-
See Nowak, Rotunda & Young, Constitutional Law § XII, at 958-59 (West, 2d ed 1983).
9 See Gross, The Minutemen and Their World 173-75 (Hill & Wang, 1976); Ryan, Cradle
of the Middle Class, ch 3 (Cambridge Univ, 1981); Walters, American Reformers, 1815-1860
29-35 (Hill & Wang, 1978).
'0 See Alexis de Tocqueville, 2 Democracy in America 128-33, 138-44 (New York, 1972).
"See, e.g., Corwin, Twiligbt of the Supreme Court (Yale Univ, 1934).
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tionalism.12 The doctrinal manifestations of commerce clause and
due process jurisprudence were not simply free-floating rules that
could be changed or abandoned without consequences extending
beyond the particular doctrine involved. These areas of doctrine
were developmentally intra- and interdependent. Modifications of
one substantive due process doctrine entailed changes in another;
developments in due process and commerce clause doctrine pro-
duced mutual, synergistic ramifications. In short, doctrinal com-
mitments made by Justices in one area of doctrine entailed corre-
sponding commitments in another area. In order to follow the trail
of the yellow dog, we must trace these ripple effects across struc-
turally related areas of doctrine.
I. ORIGINS: THE ERDMAN ACT, ADAIR V UNITED STATES, AND
COPPAGE V KANSAS
The idea of "liberty of contract" is generally thought to have
first appeared in a Supreme Court decision in Allgeyer v Louisiana,13
decided in 1897; to have entered American constitutional jurispru-
dence in 1886 with Godcharles v Wigeman; 4 and to have emerged in
American social thought well before the Civil War.15 It is curious,
then, to note that when Congress enacted the Erdman Act in 1898,
no one in either House suggested that its Section 10 was unconsti-
tutional.16 That section prohibited interstate carriers from, inter
alia, (1) requiring "any employee, or any person seeking employ-
ment, as a condition of such employment, to enter" into a so-called
"yellow-dog" contract ("an agreement, either written or verbal, not
to become or remain a member of any labor corporation, associa-
tion, or organization"), and (2) "threaten[ing] any employee with
12 See Cushman, A Stream of Legal Consciousness: The Current of Commerce Doctrinefrom Swift
to Jones & Laughlin, 61 Fordham L Rev 105 (1992); McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurispru-
dence of Government-Business Relations: Some Parameters of Laissez Faire Constitutionalism, 1863-
1897, 61 J Am Hist 970 (1975).
" 165 US 578 (1897).
14 133 Pa 431 (1886).
's Eric Foner, note 7; William Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor (cited in note 7);
Charles McCurdy, note 7; William Nelson, note 7.
16 See legislative histories of HR 4372, S 3653, and S 3662, 31 Cong Rec 74-5566 (55-2);
S Rep 591 (55-2); HR Rep 454 (55-2). For background on the enactment of the Erdman
Act, see Gerald Eggert, Railroad Labor Disputes (Univ Michigan, 1967).
[1992
YELLOW-DOG CONTRACTS 239
loss of employment" or "unjustly discriminat[ing] against any em-
ployee" because of his union membership.17 Why, in an era in
which constitutional debate on the floor of both Houses of Con-
gress flourished, 8 did these legislators believe that such abrogations
of an employer's common law contractual prerogatives were consti-
tutional?
The opinion of the district court in United States v Adair19 sug-
gests the unarticulated rationale on which many in Congress may
have relied. The indictment charged that William Adair, master
mechanic of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, had
discharged locomotive fireman 0. B. Coppage because of the lat-
ter's membership in the Order of Locomotive Firemen. Adair's
demurrer contended, inter alia, that Section 10 of the Erdman Act
violated the liberty of contract secured to him under the Fifth
Amendment.
District Judge Andrew M. Cochran conceded that the Fifth
Amendment constituted an independent limitation on the federal
power to regulate interstate commerce.2 ° The liberty of contract
secured to a lawful private business, however, was greater than
that secured to a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce.
21
Because the latter "exercises a public function," 22 held the Court,
"[t]he only possible ground for holding that [Section 10] is in viola-
tion of the fifth amendment is that it has no real and substantial
relation to the free course of interstate commerce." 23 Because Sec-
tion 10's "tendency" was "to prevent an interruption to interstate
commerce by reason of strikes, lockouts and boycotts,"24 it consti-
tuted a legitimate regulation of the contractual relations of a busi-
ness affected with a public interest. In other words, the common
carrier's status as a business affected with a public interest rendered
it subject to regulations to which a purely private business could
'p30 Stat 424, 428, ch 370 (55-2).
s See Donald G. Morgan, Congress and the Constitution: A Study of Responsibility, ch 7
(Belknap, 1966).
9 152 F 737 (ED Ky 1907).
20 Id at 754-55.
21 Id at 755-56.
22 Id at 756.
23 Id at 759.
24 Id at 752.
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not constitutionally be subjected; and the relationship between the
company's contractual relations with its employees and the free
flow of interstate commerce provided the rationale supporting the
instant regulation.
A majority of the justices of the United States Supreme Court
disagreed with Judge Cochran. The majority opinion, written by
Justice John Marshall Harlan, took no notice of the fact that the
company was a business traditionally regarded as affected with a
public interest, and stated the parties' contractual rights in absolut-
ist terms.25
While, as already suggested, the rights of liberty and property
guaranteed by the Constitution against deprivation without due
process of law, is [sic] subject to such reasonable restraints as
the common good or general welfare may require, it is not
within the functions of government-at least in the absence of
contract between the parties-to compel any person in the
course of his business and against his will to accept or retain
the personal services of another, or to compel any person,
against his will, to perform personal services for another.
The common law prerogative of the employer to discharge his
employee at will for any or no reason, Justice Harlan appeared to
be saying, was insulated from government regulation by the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Yet despite having held that the statute violated the Fifth
Amendment, Harlan went on to entertain at length the suggestion
that, the Fifth Amendment notwithstanding, Section 10 might be
a legitimate exercise of the federal power to regulate commerce
among the states.
At first blush, this seems a curious mode of analysis. The com-
merce power, after all, was conferred in Article I, Section 8 of
the original Constitution of 1787. The Fifth Amendment is an
amendment to that document, and accordingly trumps the com-
merce clause to the extent the two are in conflict. If the Fifth
Amendment rendered Section 10 of the Erdman Act unconstitu-
tional, one is led to inquire, how could the statute have been inde-
pendently sustained under the commerce power? It would seem
that Harlan's Fifth Amendment analysis should have ended the
inquiry into the statute's constitutionality.
25 Adair v United States, 208 US 161, 174 (1908).
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The solution to this puzzle lies in recognizing that Harlan and
his colleagues were, like Judge Cochran, reasoning by analogy to
Fourteenth Amendment due process cases. The Court had recog-
nized in Holden v Hardy6 and Locbner v New York 7 that the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause did not prohibit the state
from regulating the labor contract if such regulation was reasonably
related to the protection of public health, safety, or morals. Con-
ventionally termed "police powers," these powers to protect public
health, safety, and morals were held to be inherent in the sover-
eignty of the several States; and with these residuary police powers,
the Court had held, "the Fourteenth Amendment was not designed
to interfere."
28
The federal government, as a government of enumerated pow-
ers, did not have residuary police powers. However, Congress did
possess a power analogous to the police powers of the state legisla-
tures. Just as the states were empowered to legislate to protect
public health, safety, and morals, the federal government was em-
powered to legislate to protect the free flow of interstate com-
merce.29 Harlan's mode of analysis thus suggests that a majority of
the Court believed that the impact of employer-employee relations
on interstate commerce might have provided a "commercial police
power" rationale for the regulation of rights otherwise secured by
the Fifth Amendment.
Yet unlike Judge Cochran, the majority could find no "real and
substantial relation" between interstate commerce and the acts pro-
scribed by Section 10. "[What possible legal or logical connection
is there between an employee's membership in a labor organization
and the carrying on of interstate commerce?" queried Justice Har-
lan. "Such relation to a labor organization cannot have, in itself and
in the eye of the law, any bearing upon the commerce with which
the employee is connected by his labor and services."
30
One who engages in the service of an interstate carrier will, it
must be assumed, faithfully perform his duty, whether he be
a member or not a member of a labor organization. His fitness
169 US 366 (1898).
7 198 US 45 (1905).
28 Id at 53.
29 See, e.g., Swift & Co. v United States, 196 US 375 (1905).
30 Adair v United States, 208 US 161, 178 (1908) (emphasis in original).
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for the position in which he labors and his diligence in the
discharge of his duties cannot in law or sound reason depend
in any degree upon his being or not being a member of a labor
organization. It cannot be assumed that his fitness is assured,
or his diligence increased, by such membership, or that he is
less fit or less diligent because of his not being a member of
such an organization. It is the employee as a man and not as a
member of a labor organization who labors in the service of an
interstate carrier. Will it be said that the provision in question
had its origin in the apprehension, on the part of Congress,
that if it did not show more consideration for members of labor
organizations than for wage-earners who were not members of
such organizations, or if it did not insert in the statute some
such provision as the one here in question, members of labor
organizations would, by illegal or violent measures, interrupt or
impair the freedom of commerce amonr the States? We will not
indulge in any such conjectures ... '
Justice Joseph McKenna, writing in dissent, thought the major-
ity was simply being dense. "[Ilt is not necessary to suppose that
labor organizations will violate the law," wrote the dissenting Jus-
tice. "Their power may be effectively exercised without violence
or illegality .. "32 The Senate Committee had opined, McKenna
noted, that "this bill, should it become law, would reduce to a
",33minimum labor strikes which affect interstate commerce ... .
"A provision of law which will prevent or tend to prevent the
stoppage of every wheel in every car of an entire railroad system,"
wrote McKenna, certainly concerned practices having a "direct
influence on interstate commerce."
34
Yet McKenna was careful to note the limits of his disagreement
with the majority."s
I would not be misunderstood. I grant that there are rights
which can have no material measure. There are rights which,
when exercised in a private business, may not be disturbed or
limited. With them we are not concerned. We are dealing with
rights exercised in a quasi-public business and therefore subject
to control in the interest of the public.
I1 Id at 178-79.
32 Id at 187.
33 Id.
14 Id at 189.
35 Id at 190 (emphasis in original).
11992
YELLOW-DOG CONTRACTS 243
McKenna was thus thinking about Section 10 in much the same
way that Judge Cochran had. The common law contractual prerog-
atives of the employer were regulable at all only because the busi-
ness concerned was affected with a public interest; the impact that
the employer's exercise of those prerogatives exerted on interstate
commerce provided the commercial police power rationale for their
regulation.
36
Despite the fact that the majority had disagreed with McKenna
about the impact of an employer's labor policies on interstate com-
merce, both majority and minority had embraced a common ana-
lytical model. Though Harlan and his colleagues in the majority
were almost willfully agnostic about the relationship between rail-
road labor relations and interstate commerce, they had forged an
important connection between commerce clause jurisprudence and
due process jurisprudence. The sphere of liberty of contract pro-
tected by the Fifth Amendment was now defined in terms of the
impact that employer-employee relations exerted on interstate com-
merce. If the Court ever came to view those relations as exerting
a direct effect on interstate commerce, the Fifth Amendment would
no longer serve to insulate those relations from congressional regu-
lation. Moreover, though the majority had expressed no opinion
on the issue, McKenna had suggested that the employer's common
law contractual prerogatives could be regulated only if his business
was affected with a public interest. So as the category of businesses
affected with a public interest expanded, the sphere of liberty pro-
tected by the Fifth Amendment would accordingly contract. Three
areas of constitutional jurisprudence-liberty of contract, the con-
cept of a business affected with a public interest, and the notion
of what constituted a direct effect on interstate commerce-had
thus become developmentally interdependent.37
An issue similar to that presented in Adair"came before the Court
in 1915. Coppage v Kansas38 concerned the constitutionality of a
Kansas statute prohibiting employers from requiring their employ-
ees, as a condition of employment, to sign yellow-dog contracts.
36 Justice Holmes wrote a separate dissent, in which he argued, typically, that it was not
unreasonable for Congress to assume that the provisions of Section 10 would advance the
policy of preventing strikes tending to interrupt interstate commerce. 208 US at 190-92.
37 On the consequences of interdoctrinal synergy for commerce clause doctrine, see Cush-
man, note 12.
" 236 US 1 (1915).
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A Mr. Hedges, a switchman for the St. Louis & San Francisco
Railway Company and a member of the Switchmen's Union of
North America, had refused to sign a yellow-dog contract pre-
sented to him by his employer. Mr. T. B. Coppage, superintendent
of the company (and apparently no relation to the 0. B. Coppage
of Adair), had accordingly discharged Mr. Hedges. Mr. Coppage
was indicted and convicted under the Kansas statute, and appealed
his conviction to the Supreme Court.
Justice Mahlon Pitney, who had voted for the Erdman Act in
1898 while a Congressman from Morristown, New Jersey, 39 wrote
the opinion of the Court declaring the statute unconstitutional. The
Kansas statute, the Court held, was not distinguishable in principle
from the federal statute reviewed in Adair. "Under constitutional
freedom of contract," wrote Pitney, "whatever either party has the
right to treat as sufficient ground for terminating the employment,
where there is no stipulation on the subject, he has the right to
provide against by insisting that a stipulation respecting it shall be
a sine qua non of the inception of the employment, or of its continu-
ance if it be terminable at will."°
Because Coppage concerned a state statute, the commerce power
could not be invoked to provide a police power rationale. The
regulatory justification would accordingly have to be found within
the conventional categories of the state's police power. "[W]hat
possible relation," asked Pitney, did the statute have "to the public
health, safety, morals or general welfare? None is suggested, and
we are unable to conceive of any."'" The primary object of the
statute was that of "leveling inequalities of fortune," 42 and this was
not a recognized police power rationale.
Justice McKenna, who had dissented in Adair, demonstrated his
fidelity to Adair's analytical model by joining the Coppage majority.
Both cases had involved regulations of a business affected with a
public interest. But in Coppage, unlike in Adair, there had been no
police power rationale on which to justify the.regulation of the
employment contract.
39 31 Cong Rec 5053 (55-2).
40 236 US at 13 (emphasis in original).
41 Id at 16.
42 Id at 18.
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Dissenting for himself and Justice Hughes,4 3 Justice Day chided
the majority for not taking the associative rights of the workers
seriously. "Would it be beyond the legitimate exercise of the police
power," asked the dissenters, "to provide that an employee should
not be required to agree, as a condition of employment, to forego
affiliation with a particular political party, or the support of a par-
ticular candidate for office?"' Might not the State prohibit an em-
ployer from requiring its employee to join or not to join a particular
church?4" "It seems to me," wrote Justice Day, "that these ques-
tions answer themselves."' "The law should be as zealous to pro-
tect the constitutional liberty of the employee as it is to guard that
of the employer. A principal object of this statute is to protect the
liberty of the citizen to make such lawful affiliations as he may
desire with organizations of his choice. It should not be necessary
to the protection of the liberty of one citizen that the same right
in another citizen be abridged or destroyed."'47
A defense of the right to join a union cast in the rhetoric of
freedom of association was not novel in 1915. In Commonwealth v
Hunt,48 decided in 1842, Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw of the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court had deployed similar associational
language in his landmark opinion holding that labor unions were
not per se criminal conspiracies.4 9 In upholding the right of the
Boston Journeymen Bootmakers' Society to organize, Shaw sought
to analogize unions to other common societies formed for purposes
of mutual aid and protection. "Such an association," he wrote,
"might be used to afford each other assistance in times of poverty,
" Holmes again dissented separately, arguing that Adair and Lochner ought to be over-
ruled. 236 US at 26-27.
4 236 US at 37.
'" Id at 39.
46 Id at 37.
" Id at 40.
4'4 Met 111 (1842).
49 Id at 129-31, 134. See Leon Fink, Labor, Liberty and the Law: Trade Unionism and the
Problem of the American Constitutional Order, 74 J Am Hist 904, 910 (1987); A. Konefsky, 'As
Best to Subserve Their Own Interests": Lemuel Shaw, Labor Conspiray, and Fellow Servants, 7
Law & Hist Rev 219 (1989); Levy, The Law of the Commonwealth and ChiefJustice Shaw 203
(Harvard Univ, 1957); Tomlins, The State and the Unions: Labor Relations, Law, and the Orga-
nized Labor Movement, 1880-1960, 42-44 (Cambridge Univ, 1985); Woodiwiss, Rights v.
Conspiracy: A Sociological Essay on the History of Labour Law in the United States 58-61 (St.
Martin's, 1990).
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sickness and distress; or to raise their intellectual, moral or social
condition; or to make improvement in their art; or for other proper
purposes.""0 The association's objective of recruiting all bootmakers
into the society was not unlawful, Shaw held, for it would give to
the union "a power which might be exerted for [such] useful and
honorable purposes ... "51
Following Shaw's opinion in Hunt, American courts generally
adhered to the view that the formation of labor associations for
mutual aid and protection was perfectly legal. 2 Indeed, throughout
the balance of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, American
judges generally agreed that strikes to obtain higher wages, shorter
hours, or better working conditions were lawful.5 3 Shaw's view
that strikes to obtain a closed shop were legal, however, was not
so readily accepted by the American bench. Throughout the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, state and federal courts
repeatedly held that strikes and boycotts designed to secure the
employment of only union workers were unlawful. 4 Such union
actions were enjoinable, the courts held, for two reasons: first, they
constituted coercive interferences with the right of the employer
to run his business as he saw fit; and second, they aimed to require
the non-union workingman to surrender a portion of his associa-
tional liberty as the price of plying his lawful trade.
50 4 Met at 129.
51 Id.
52 Indeed, some courts occasionally expressed the view that the formation of such associa-
tions was not only not criminal, but positively laudable. See, e.g., Coeur D'Alene Consolidated
& Mining Co. v Miners' Union, 51 F 260, 263 (CCD Idaho 1892); State v Stewart, 9 A 559,
566 (Vt 1887).
53 Arnold Paul, Conservative Crisis and the Rule of Law 106 (P Smith, 1976); Herbert Hoven-
kamp, Enterprise and American Law, 1836-1937 216, 226 (Harvard Univ, 1991).
51 Id. Hovenkamp, supra at 233. See Coeur D'Alene Consolidated & Mining Co. v Miners'
Union of Wardner, 51 F 260 (CCD Idaho 1892); Casey v Cincinnati Typographical Union No. 3,
45 F 135 (SD Ohio 1891); Old Dominion Steamship Co. v McKenna, 30 F 48 (SDNY 1887);
Bausch Machine Tool Co. v Hill, 231 Mass 30 (1918); Snow Iron Works v Chadwick, 227 Mass
382, 116 NE 801 (1917); Martin v Francke, 227 Mass 272, 116 NE 404 (1917); Folsom v Lewis,
208 Mass 336, 94 NE 316 (1911); Plant v Woods, 176 Mass 492 (1900); Erdman v Mitchell,
207 Pa 79 (1903); State v Dyer, 67 Vt 690, 32 A 814 (1895); State v Stewart, 59 Vt 273, 9 A
559 (1887); State v Glidden, 55 Conn 46 (1887); State v Donaldson, 32 NJL 151 (1867). See
also Kayser v Fitzgerald, 178 NYS 130 (1919); Kealey v Faulkner, 7 Ohio NP 49 (1907); Lucke
v Clothing Cutters'Assembly, 77 Md 396, 26 A 505 (1893); Ernst, The Closed Shop, the Proprietary
Capitalist, and the Law, 1897-1915 in S. Jacoby, ed, Masters to Managers (1989). See also




In Plant v Woods, 5 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
condemned the defendant union's threats to strike and boycott em-
ployers employing certain non-union plaintiffs. "The purpose of
these defendants," the court found, "was to force the plaintiffs to
join the defendant association, and to that end they injured the
plaintiffs in their business, and molested and disturbed them in
their efforts to work at their trade." 6 The union men "had no
right to force other persons to join them." ' The attempt by the
defendants "to compel the [non-union men] against their will to
join the association" was, the court held, "intolerable, and inconsis-
tent with the spirit of our laws."
58
Erdman v Mitchell59 involved one closed-shop strike in a larger
campaign "to drive every plumber in Philadelphia into the United
Association of Journeyman Plumbers."6 In Erdman, the court
found that the defendant union members, through a perfectly
peaceful strike, "undertook, by intimidation of plaintiffs and their
employers to coerce the plaintiffs into joining their organization."
61
"By this conduct of defendants," the court noted, "plaintiffs have
been unable to secure any steady employment at their trade, and
will have to enter one of defendants' unions or leave the city."
62
Condemning the union's actions, the court accepted the plaintiff's
contention that "an agreement by a number of persons that they
will by threats of a strike deprive a mechanic of the right to work
for others merely because he does not choose to join a particular
union, is a conspiracy to commit an unlawful act, which conspiracy
may be restrained., 63 Erdman is of particular interest, because it
was not a case of a court protecting the right of workers to remain
non-union men. The plaintiffs in the case were actually members
of another union, who wished to remain loyal to the association
with which they had voluntarily affiliated.
55 176 Mass 492 (1900).
51 Id at 502.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 207 Pa 79 (1903).
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In Casey v Cincinnati Typographical Union, the court decried the
boycott of a non-union newspaper as "an organized effort to force
printers to come into the union, or be driven from their calling for
want of employment."64 The court in Old Dominion Steamship Co. v
McKenna stated the rule succinctly: "All combinations and associa-
tions designed to coerce workmen to become members, or to inter-
fere with, obstruct, vex, or annoy them in working, or in obtaining
work, because they are not members... arepro tanto illegal combi-
nations or associations."
65
As these cases made clear, the rights of workers to associate
together, even to strike, were legally protected; these rights simply
could not be used as a means to coerce workers in the exercise of
their right to freedom of association. In deploying associational
rhetoric in the Coppage dissent, Day and Hughes were simply call-
ing for symmetry in the protection of associational liberty. Granted
that the employer's liberty of contract was generally constitution-
ally protected, the dissenters would have held, the state could con-
stitutionally prohibit him from using his freedom of contract to
coerce the employee into forgoing his associational liberty. "While
this court should, within the limitations of the constitutional guar-
anty, protect the free right of contract, it is not less important that
the State be given the right to exert its legislative authority, if it
deems best to do so, for the protection of rights which inhere in
the privileges of the citizen of every free country."66
At the core of the disagreement between the majority and the
dissent lay a difference over whether the employee's agreement not
to join a union was the product of coercion. The majority was able
to resolve the tension between liberty of contract and freedom of
association by finding simply that the employee had voluntarily
contracted away this associational right. To the majority justices,
there was no coercion involved.67 The dissenters could not accept
this voluntary waiver theory; indeed, they seemed prepared to take
judicial notice that such a waiver would always be the product of
coercion. Day and Hughes saw the inequality of bargaining power
between employer and employee as rendering the employment re-
6 45 F 135, 143 (SD Ohio 1891).
6' 30 F 48, 50 (SDNY 1887) (emphasis in original).
66 Coppage v Kansas, 236 US 1, 40 (1915).
67 Id at 8-9, 14-16, 20-21.
[1992
YELLOW-DOG CONTRACTS 249
lationship inherently subject to coercive abuse. The yellow-dog
contract was for them coercive per se.
68
Yet the majority was not taking the position that economic pres-
sure exerted in the employment context could not constitute coer-
cion. Less than three years following the Coppage decision, the
Court would enjoin an effort by the United Mine Workers to
unionize a non-union mine.69 All of the employees of the Hitchman
Coal & Coke Company had signed yellow-dog contracts. An agent
of the U.M.W. proceeded secretly to persuade employees of the
company to agree to join the union. The plan was that, once a
sufficient number of employees had agreed to do so, they would
quit in a body, join the union, and refuse to return to work unless
the company consented to a closed-shop agreement with the
U.M.W.
The Court enjoined the U.M.W.'s actions as an unlawful at-
tempt to induce the employees to breach their contracts with the
company. The Court further made it clear that it was troubled by
"misrepresentations, deceptive statements, and threats of pecuni-
ary loss" made by the union representative to the company's em-
ployees, as well as by the history of violence associated with coal
strikes.7" But the Court also repeatedly condemned threats to strike
for a closed-shop agreement as "coercive" of the employer and of
the employees who had chosen not to join the union.71 The objec-
tive of such a strike, the Court stated, would be "to coerce the
employer and the remaining miners to 'organize the mine,' that is,
to make an agreement that none but members of the Union should
be employed .. "72 "The same liberty which enables men to
form unions, and through the union to enter into agreements with
employers willing to agree, entitles other men to remain indepen-
dent of the union... .73
In dissent, Justice Brandeis criticized the asymmetry presented
by the Coppage and Hitchman decisions. "If it is coercion to threaten
to strike unless [the employer] consents to a closed union shop, it
6' Id at 32, 35, 38-42.
69 Hitcbman Coal & Coke Co. v Mitchell, 245 US 229 (1917).
70 Id at 258-59.
7' Id at 248, 250-51, 253, 255, 258-59, 261.
72 Id at 255.
" Id at 251.
250 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW
is coercion also to threaten not to give one employment unless the
[employee] will consent to a closed non-union shop. The employer
may sign the union agreement for fear that labor may not be other-
wise available; the workman may sign the individual agreement for
fear that employment may not otherwise be obtainable."7 4 As Bran-
deis was not-so-obliquely suggesting, the fact that the Court (and
the American judiciary generally) simultaneously embraced the
view that a strike for a closed shop was coercive while the exaction
of a yellow-dog contract was not75 seemed the rankest anti-union
hypocrisy.
Perhaps it was. The majority may have remained troubled by
the reputation for violence and syndicalism that had become associ-
ated with unionism as a result of the events of Haymarket Square,
Homestead, the "Debs Rebellion," and other similar instances.76
Yet the majority's view that yellow-dog contracts were not coercive
may not have seemed as preposterous in 1915 as it appears from
the vantage point of the late twentieth century. As Herbert Hoven-
kamp has recently noted, America suffered throughout the nine-
teenth century from severe shortages of labor. In part as results of
such shortages, slavery persisted in the United States long after it
had disappeared in other Western nations; American entrepreneurs
led the world in the development of labor-saving technology;
America maintained virtually an open immigration policy; and the
United States experienced significantly less labor unrest than con-
temporary England. Wages in the United States rose steadily
throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and
wages and working conditions for American laborers were gener-
ally far better than those obtained by European workers.
77
71 Id at 271 (emphasis in original). Justice Brandeis actually concluded that neither the
strike to obtain a closed-shop nor a yellow-dog contract implied "coercion in a legal sense."
Id.
7' For a discussion of the near-unanimity of state court decisions holding anti-yellow-dog
contract statutes unconstitutional, see Coppage v Kansas, 236 US at 21-26. It should be noted
that not all states condemned strikes to obtain a closed shop. In those states, of course, the
asymmetry criticized by Brandeis was not present. See Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35 Harv
L Rev 393, 407-8, n 49 (1922).
76 See Paul, Conservative Crisis and the Rule of Law (cited in note 53). The stronger claim
that the Court was anti-worker would be harder to sustain. For example, in 1917, the year
Hitcbman was decided, the Court upheld an Oregon law limiting the working day for men
to ten hours. Bunting v Oregon, 243 US 426 (1917).




In light of these historical consequences of the labor shortage,
argues Hovenkamp, political economists writing in the early twen-
tieth century "perceived the bargaining positions of capital and
labor as more or less equal. Indeed, they felt that the advantage,
if any, lay with labor .... They argued that it was labor and not
employers that could make take-it-or-leave-it offers."
78
Illustrative of the view that laborers could avail themselves of a
veritable smorgasbord of employment options was the opinion of
the Georgia Supreme Court in Western & Atlantic R.R. Co. v
Bishop.79 In Bishop, an employee of the railroad had in his employ-
ment contract waived his statutory right to recover against the
company for injuries occasioned by the negligence of his fellow
servant. Subsequently injured by a fellow employee, Bishop
sought to have the waiver set aside on the grounds that it violated
public policy. Bishop relied heavily on the U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Railroad Company v Lockwood,8" which had held void as
against public policy a contract exempting a common carrier from
liability for damage to freight or passengers caused by the negli-
gence of the carrier or its servants. Distinguishing Lockwood, the
Georgia court held that the carrier stood in a monopolistic relation
to the passenger or shipper, and its contractual prerogatives could
be regulated for that reason. In relation to its employee, however,
the railroad held no such monopoly. Upholding the contractual
waiver, the court held that the railroad was "only one of a million of
employers with whom [Bishop] might have sought employment."
81
The massive waves of immigration to the United States in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries may have helped
somewhat to ameliorate the perception of labor shortage that un-
doubtedly lay behind the Georgia court's seemingly hyperbolic
remarks. Between 1886 and 1916, nearly 19 million immigrants
arrived in the United States. 82 Yet wage rates continued to rise
significantly, especially in the years leading up to the Coppage deci-
sion. Despite nearly flat growth in the 1890s, real wages in the
78 Id at 930-31. Hovenkamp offers this observation as a means of explaining why early-
twentieth-century courts and political economists were inclined to treat labor combinations
as analogous to, rather than different from, business combinations.
79 50 Ga 465 (1874).
s 17 Wall 375 (1873).
8' 50 Ga at 472.
s Ellis Hawley, The Great War and the Search for a Modern Order 11-12 (New York, 1979).
252 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW
United States rose 37 percent between 1890 and 1914.83 This oc-
curred despite the fact that not even 8 percent of the American
labor force was unionized at any time before 1914.84 The produc-
tive capacity of the American economy appeared to be more than
adequate to absorb the flood of new immigrants.8" Indeed, the lot
of the American worker seemed to be getting consistently better
rather than worse.86 The existence of some unemployment was
acknowledged, but was frequently attributed to laziness or other
defects of character. 87 In 1907, the year in which the Hitchman
case was commenced, the nationwide unemployment rate was 2.8
percent;88 in 1917, the year of the Court's decision, the national
rate was only 4.6 percent. 89 There was little reason to think that
the remote panhandle of West Virginia harbored a large untapped
reservoir of labor. As Justice Pitney wrote for the majority, "[i]t
was one thing for [the company] to find, from time to time, compar-
atively small numbers of men to take vacant places in a going mine,
another and a much more difficult thing to find a complete gang
of new men to start up a mine shut down by a strike. ... .90
Though the Court probably did not have access to some of these
" Stuart Bruchey, The Wealth of the Nation 138 (Harper & Row, 1988).
'4 Id at 137.
8' Between 1901 and 1913 the nationwide unemployment rate in the manufacturing and
transportation sectors rose above 7 percent only twice, in the recession years of 1904 and
1908. In all other years, the rate was below 6 percent; in seven of those thirteen years, the
rate was 4 percent or lower. Commons et al, 3 History of Labor in the United States 128
(Macmillan, 1935). The nationwide unemployment rate for the entire civilian workforce
during those years rose above 6 percent only twice, in 1908 and 1911. In all other years,
the rate was below 6 percent; in five of those thirteen years, the rate was 4 percent or lower.
Stanley Lebergott, Manpower in Economic Growth: The American Record Since 1800 43-47, 512
(New York, 1964). The average national unemployment rate for all civilian workers in the
decade 1900-1909 was 4 percent; for the decade 1910-1919, the figure was 5 percent. Id at
189.
' Dubofsky, Industrialism and the American Worker, 1865-1920, 119 (H. Davidson, 1985).
8' Commons et al, note 85, at 115; John Garraty, Unemployment in History 113-18 (Harper
& Row, 1979); Lebergott, note 85, at 166; Roy Lubove, The Struggle for Social Security 147
(Harvard Univ, 1968).
88 Lebergott, note 85, at 512.
' Id. The rate for the manufacturing and transportation sectors in each of those years
was 3.5 percent. Commons et al, note 85, at 128. Moreover, at least some of this unemploy-
ment was probably attributable to factors having little to do with the size of the labor
supply: inability to work during certain months of the year due to weather conditions,
which particularly afflicted the nation's large population of agricultural workers; a lack of
paid vacations to absorb seasonal declines in demand; and perhaps in some regions a higher
incidence of worker illness than we experience today. Lebergott, note 85, at 165-71.
o Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v Mitchell, 245 US 229, 258 (1917).
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specific statistics on wages and employment, the Justices undoubt-
edly entertained at least an impressionistic understanding of their
import. In his opinion striking down the District of Columbia mini-
mum wage law in Adkins v Cbildren's Hospital,9 Justice Sutherland
remarked: "[w]e cannot close our eyes to the notorious fact that
earnings everywhere in all occupations have increased-not alone
in States where the minimum wage law obtains but in the country
generally .. "92 Reasoning in the idiom of Adam Smith, many
legal minds must have continued to believe that the growth in
demand for labor had exceeded the growth in supply. A judge who
had grown to maturity in the labor-short nineteenth century might
well have thought that the American laborer in 1915 was actually
bargaining from a position of some strength.93 To be sure, individ-
ual laborers and employers often did not bargain from equal posi-
tions of strength-even in times of low unemployment-and the
Coppage majority recognized this.94 But these disparities in bar-
gaining power were not in the majority's view so great as to render
the labor contract the product of coercion. As they saw it, the
laborer wishing to retain his freedom to associate with a union
could always find another employer to bargain with. Recognizing
the structure of the labor market and the perceived ease of em-
ployee mobility, 95 an employer in a labor-hungry market was in
no position to "coerce" his employee into contracting away his
associational freedom. But an employer struck for a closed shop
was frequently in no position to bargain with a non-union man.
If such a view was problematic in 1915, it was to become increas-
ingly implausible. The demobilization of the armed forces follow-
ing World War I, coupled with the tremendous influx of European
immigrants in 1919 and 1920, caused fears of widespread unem-
ployment. 96 Indeed, 192 l's unemployment rates of 21.2 percent in
the manufacturing and transportation sectors marked the highest
rate in decades. 97 President Harding brought together a Commis-
9' 261 US 525 (1923).
92 Id at 560.
9' Hovenkamp, note 77, at 931.
9' Coppage v Kansas 236 US 1, 17 (1915).
95 Hovenkamp, note 77, at 93 1.
96 Parmet, Labor and Immigration in Industrial America 169-90 (Twayne, 1981).
9' Commons et al, note 85, at 128. The nationwide civilian unemployment rate of 11.7
percent was the highest since 1898. Lebergott, note 85, at 43, 512.
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sion on Unemployment in 1921, and attempts to alleviate the prob-
lem through state unemployment insurance programs began in ear-
nest. 98 The AFL again renewed its long-standing campaign for
immigration restriction. Some business interests predictably con-
tended that there was a labor shortage, but few were persuaded.
In 1921 and again in 1924, a Republican-controlled Congress and
White House enacted and signed legislation placing substantial re-
strictions on immigration.' Despite this contrived contraction of
the labor market, the subsequent onset of the Great Depression
brought sustained unemployment in numbers previously unimag-
inable. 1
00
The cases condemning strikes for a closed shop demonstrated
that the courts were prepared to see coercion in economic pressure
exerted by one of the parties to the employment relationship. As
the Hitchman case illustrated, the meaning of the term "coercion"
was not so constricted that the Court could not have found that an
employee was coerced into signing a yellow-dog contract. There
was no need for the Court to expand its notion of coercion to
include pressure brought to bear from a superior bargaining posi-
tion. In order to arrive at the conclusion that yellow-dog contracts
were coercive, however, the Court would have to change its as-
sumptions about the relative bargaining strengths of employers and
employees. Changes in the structure of the labor market between
1915 and the 1930s would prompt a re-examination of those as-
sumptions.
Yet in 1915 Day and Hughes were not contending that the em-
ployment relationship was inherently coercive and therefore regu-
lable in all its aspects.10' The dissenters were instead suggesting
that there were certain valuable rights of association to which lib-
erty of contract ought to give way. Indeed, it was the nature of
the right compromised that appears to have led them to the conclu-
" Lubove, note 87, at ch 7.
99 Parmet, note 96, at 169-90.
100 In 1932, more than 13 million adult men were unemployed. Leuchtenburg, Franklin
D. Roosevelt and the New Deal 1 (Harper & Row, 1963). In 1933, fully 25 percent of the labor
force was unemployed. Bruchey, note 83, at 157-58. In the decade of 1930-1939, the
average national unemployment rate was 18 percent. Lebergott, note 85, at 189.
101 For an early analysis of the concept of coercion in the employment relationship and
other contexts, see Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 Pol
Sci Q 470 (1923).
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sion that the bargain was coerced. Day's analogies between yellow-
dog contracts and contracts promising not to join a particular
church, political party, or other "such lawful affiliations" were of
course designed to reduce the majority's position to absurdity. But
by implying that the majority would have decided cases involving
such hypothetical contracts differently, the dissenters were also
accusing the majority of according labor unions second-class status
as voluntary associations. As one historian has put it, "American
labor organizations lived in a legal twilight zone, expressions of an
associational impulse growing in society at large, yet differentiated
from other expressions of that impulse by society's law .. "102
In 1915, only Day, Holmes, and Hughes were prepared to reach
across that twilight zone to assimilate unionism to liberalism's tradi-
tional solicitude for voluntary association. In 1930, however,
Hughes would return from a fourteen-year hiatus in his judicial
career to lead a reconstituted Court. During his tenure as Chief
Justice, the accommodation between contractual and associational
liberty for which he and Justice Day had contended would be
struck.
II. WARTIME LESSONS AND A NEW PROFILE FOR
ORGANIZED LABOR
As the country confronted the exigencies of domestic pro-
duction, communication, and transportation brought on by World
War I, it became clear that the Adair majority's professed agnosti-
cism on the relationship between union-management relations and
interstate commerce was no longer tenable. It was now "essential
to the national safety that the volume of production be maintained
at the highest possible level, and that the avenues of communication
and transportation remain always open." ' 3 It was recognized that
industrial strife would tend to frustrate the implementation of these
critical objectives. Accordingly, the National War Labor Board
was established in April of 1918 for the purpose of ensuring the
peaceful and prompt settlement of labor disputes in vital war indus-
tries.'04
102 Tomlins, note 49, at 33.
103 Joel Seidman, The Yellow Dog Contract 25 Uohns Hopkins, 1932).
104 Id; Valerie Jean Conner, The National War Labor Board, ch 2 (Univ North Carolina,
1983); Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft 915 (Farrar & Rinehart, 1939).
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President Wilson appointed to the co-chairmanship of the Board
former President William Howard Taft. Taft, a former judge on
the United States Court of Appeals, a professor at Yale Law
School, and a future Chief Justice of the United States, was per-
haps the most prominent conservative lawyer of the day, and was
widely expected to be a pro-employer member of the Board. But,
as Taft's biographer reports, the future Chief Justice found his
experience on the Board to be personally transformative. An ex-
tended trip to the munitions and textile mills of the South con-
vinced Taft of the need for the establishment of minimum wages.
This conviction was duly reflected in the orders of the Board, and
subsequently in Taft's dissent in Adkins v Children's Hospital. 
10 5
Taft and his fellow Board members also recognized that indus-
trial peace was necessary to the uninterrupted production and
transportation of the goods needed for the successful prosecution
of the war. To this end the Board announced that (1) "The right
of workers to organize in trade unions and to bargain collectively,
through chosen representatives, is recognized. This right shall not
be denied, abridged, or interfered with by the employers in any
manner whatsoever"; and (2) "Employers shall not discharge work-
ers for membership in trade unions, nor for legitimate trade union
activities."1' 6 The Board ordered numerous reinstatements with
back pay for employees discharged for engaging in legitimate union
activities; prohibited employers from requiring employees to sign
yellow-dog contracts; and forbade employers to require their em-
ployees to join company unions. 107 Indeed, the Board ordered em-
ployers to discontinue the use of yellow-dog contracts in cases
involving General Electric, Smith & Wesson, and the Omaha and
Council Bluffs Street Railway Company. 108 The war had temporar-
ily transformed businesses that were ordinarily purely private into
businesses affected with a national public interest and consequently
10S Conner, supra; Pringle, supra, at 916, 918.
,06 US Bureau of Labor Statistics, National War Labor Board, Bulletin No 287, 30-34
(1922), quoted in Philip Taft, Collective Bargaining Before the New Deal, in Harry A. Millis,
ed, How Collective Bargaining Works 901-2 (New York, 1942); Presidential proclamation,
April 8, 1918, cited in Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft at 917-18 (cited
in note 104).
107 Conner, The National War Labor Board (cited in note 104); Philip Taft, supra, at 902.
108 Conner, note 104, at ch 7; Daniel Ernst, The Yellow Dog Contract and Liberal Reform,
1917-1932, 30 Labor History 251, 254 (1989); Pringle, note 104, at 921; Seidman, note 103,
at 25; Edwin Witte, The Government in Labor Disputes 222 (McGraw-Hill, 1932).
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subject to a greater degree of regulation.109 And the National War
Labor Board, headed up by a leading conservative and the next
Chief Justice, had taken judicial notice of the fact that an em-
ployer's interference with his employees' legitimate associational
activities could impede the capacity of such a business to perform
its crucial public function.
110
The years following World War I also brought increasing solici-
tude for the associational rights of the nation's workers. This may
well have been a by-product of changing perceptions about the
nature of labor unions. At the turn of the century, Christopher
Tomlins has noted, the leadership of the American labor movement
had embraced trade unionism as a means to achieve larger, radical
political goals. Through association, Samuel Gompers had ex-
plained, "the workers would come to know that 'the state is by
rights theirs' and would thereupon take over the functions of gov-
ernment 'in the interests of all.'""" Collective bargaining was "an
entering wedge toward industrial democracy and abolition of the
profit system," the end result of which would be "full labor con-
trol" of industry. 112
Over the course of the next twenty years, however, the AFL
sloughed off "its old associational ideology for a redefined volunta-
rism which drastically downplayed the radical political connota-
tions of associationalism.' Instead of a means to "accomplish
the transformation of prevailing political and social institutions,"
"[v]oluntary association and collective bargaining became mecha-
nisms for the improvement of material conditions within the politi-
cal and industrial framework of the new corporate economy.
' 14
By World War I, Tomlins argues, "this ideology was manifest
109 See Block v Hirsh, 256 US 135, 155 (1921).
"10 See David Brody, The American Worker in the Progressive Age: A Comprebensive Analysis,
in Brody, Workers in Industrial America 42 (Oxford Univ, 1980); Brody, The Emergence of Mass
Production Unionism, in Braeman et al, eds, Change and Continuity in Twentieth Century America
243 (Ohio Univ, 1964).
11 Tomlins, note 49, at 74; see also id at 54-59.
"1 Id, quoting Robert F. Hoxie in Trade Unionism in the United States 274-75 (D. Appleton,
1923); Forbath, note 7, at 800-817.
"I Tomlins, note 49, at 77.
114 Id at 74-75; see David Brody, The Expansion oftheAmerican Labor Movement: Institutional
Sources of Stimulus and Restraint, in Brody, ed, The American Labor Movement 121 (Harper &
Row, 1971); Samuel Gompers, Labor and the Employer 286 (Arno, 1920).
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in virtually all of the AFL leadership's actions..... Rather than
conceptualizing themselves as corporative bodies seeking to absorb
the functions of the state, AFL unions now saw themselves as
individual entities pursuing their own legitimate self-interests
within the state's common law contractualist paradigm. "Organized
workers, they argued, were freely associating citizens who ought
to enjoy the same freedoms of action and expression that individual
workers and citizens enjoyed. . . . In Gompers's hands, the AFL
model was a labor version of the kind of business-based association-
alism that elite reformers like Herbert Hoover and organizations
like the National Civic Federation advocated during the first de-
cades of the new century. 116 In addition, the AFL sought to refur-
bish its public image "by providing a model of the good worker/
citizen that was essentially the same as that to be found in the
literature of the middle-class, Progressive movement. The worker
was intelligent, responsible, civic-minded, thrifty, self-reliant, tol-
erant of other people's religions, and patriotic .. ."
The liberalization of the AFL was accompanied by two other
major developments in the history of labor unions. First, as the
result of a wave of prosecutions initiated during and in the wake
of World War I, the syndicalist Industrial Workers of the World
was virtually defunct by the early 1920s. 118 Second, the years fol-
lowing World War I also saw the relationship between the Socialist
Party and the nation's workers grow increasingly attenuated. By
1921, membership in the Party had dwindled to 13,000.119 By
1928, membership had fallen to under 8,000, and the party had
become "increasingly an organization of ministers and intellectuals
rather than industrial workers."12 "The labor movement of the
1920's," Tomlins concludes, "was a loose and disaggregated combi-
nation of individual organizations, not the quasi-syndicalist associa-
115 Tomlins, note 49, at 77.
1,6 William Forbath, Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement 147 (Harvard
Univ, 1991).
117 Anthony Woodiwiss, Rights v. Conspiracy, note 49, at 139; see Sweeney, The A.F.L.'s
Good Citizen, 1920-1940, 13 Labor History (1972). -
"18 Joseph Rayback, A History of American Labor 282, 289-90 (Macmillan, 1968); see Con-
lin, Bread and Roses, Too (Greenwood, 1969); Melvyn Dubofsky, We Shall be All: A History
of the Industrial Workers of the World (Quadrangle, 1969).
119 Hawley, note 82, at 130.
'20 Id at 131.
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tion of self-governing trades established in 1886. As such, its recon-
ciliation to the prevailing common law tradition was no longer
problematic.' 121 In other words, unions had come increasingly to
be seen as liberal institutions.
These changes in the complexion of the labor movement made
defenses of unions cast in the rhetoric of liberal rights discourse
increasingly resonant. Indeed, the growing recognition of the asso-
ciational legitimacy of unions was widely expressed in the critique
of yellow-dog contracts that flourished in the 1920s. Opponents
of the contract "repeatedly depicted the agreement as an illiberal
institution, which snatched from workers their rights of free associ-
ation, speech, and thought.' ' 122 The yellow-dog contract, argued
one Illinois labor leader, violated the workers' rights of free associa-
tion, "the essential difference between the free man and the
slave."' 123 Such contracts were "a plain denial of the right of associa-
tion," wrote Felix Frankfurter and Nathan Greene. 124 Echoing Jus-
tice Day's Coppage dissent, Edwin Witte wrote: "would anyone
tolerate for a moment aid by the courts to employers in the en-
forcement ... of promises which they may exact from their em-
ployees not to join the Methodist Church or the Masons, or any
other religious or fraternal organization?' 121 Cornelius Cochrane, a
persistent critic of the contract for the American Labor Legislation
Review, likewise echoed Justice Day's critique. "Union labor," he
wrote, "is convinced that if employers insisted upon employees
signing a contract that they would not vote the Republican or
Democratic ticket, or attend the Protestant or Catholic Church, or
join the Knights of Columbus or the Masons, there would be an
immediate public outcry against this invasion of the right of volun-
tary association. 126 "[U]nless we are permanently to overthrow the
American principle that organization into voluntary societies is to
be encouraged rather than strangled," Cochrane contended, "the
2 Tomlins, note 49, at 91; see William Forbath, note 116, at 128-35.
122 Ernst, note 108, at 263.
123 Id.
124 Frankfurter and Greene, Congressional Power Over the Labor Injunction, 31 Colo L Rev
385, 396 (1931).
' Edwin Witte, "Yellow Dog" Contracts, 6 Wis L Rev 21, 31 (1930).
126 Cochrane, Why Organized Labor is Fighting "Yellow Dog" Contracts, 15 Am Lab Legis
Rev 227, 232 (1925).
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'yellow dog' contract must be declared illegal."' 27 A study of labor
relations in the coal industry undertaken by the United States Coal
Commission in 1922 and 1923 resulted in a scathing denunciation
of the contract. "A manager," stated the Commission's report,
"who can mine coal only with the use of spies, intimidation, and
forced contracts, which aim to destroy the freedom of will of his
workers, is not much of a manager and less of a man."
128
By the late 1920s the New York courts were refusing to enforce
yellow-dog contracts on the grounds that they were void for lack
of mutuality. 129 Emboldened by the trend, Wisconsin passed a stat-
ute in 1929 declaring yellow-dog contracts void and unenforceable
as opposed to public policy; Arizona, Colorado, Ohio, and Oregon
followed suit two years later. 13 And in 1930 the Senate rejected
the nomination of John J. Parker to the Supreme Court largely
because Parker had upheld the validity of yellow-dog contracts in
the Red Jacket Coal case.131 Even Parker's Senate supporters vigor-
ously denounced the yellow-dog contract, and called for its statu-
tory abolition. 132 Of the ten Senators who spoke in defense of
Parker's nomination, only one suggested that the contract was legit-
imate.a33
'27 Cochrane, "Yellow Dog" Abolished in Wisconsin, 19 Am Lab Legis Rev 315, 316 (1929).
128 Seidman, note 103, at 31-32.
129 See Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v Lavin, 247 NY 65, 159 NE 863 (1928); Exchange
Bakery and Restaurant, Inc. v Rifkin, 245 NY 260, 157 NE 130 (1927); Interborough Rapid
Transit Co. v Green, 131 Misc 682, 227 NYS 258 (1928); Carey and Oliphant, The Present
Status of the Hitchman Case, 29 Colum L Rev 441 (1929); Cochrane, Branding "Yellow Dog"
Contracts, 18 Am Lab Legis Rev 115 (1928); Witte, "Yellow Dog" Contracts (cited in note 125).
130 Irving Bernstein, The Lean Years 394, 411 (Houghton Mifflin, 1960); Cochrane, "Yellow
Dog" Abolished in Wisconsin (cited in note 127); Witte, note 108, at 228; Seidman, note 103,
at 35. The proliferation of state anti-yellow-dog statutes continued throughout the 1930s.
See Fraenkel, Recent Statutes Affecting Labor Injunctions and "Yellow Dog" Contracts, 30 I11 L
Rev 854, 858-59 (1936). Many of these statutes sought to preserve associational liberty by
prohibiting not only yellow-dog contracts, but agreements requiring the employee to join a
union as well. Id at 859, n 29.
131 United Mine Workers v Red Jacket Consolidated Coal & Coke Co., 18 F2d 839 (CCA 4th,
1927), cert denied, 275 US 536 (1927); Irving Bernstein, note 130, at 406-9; Cochrane,
Public Opinion Flays Judicial Approval of "Yellow Dog" Contracts, 20 Am Lab Legis Rev 181
(1930).
132 Irving Bernstein, note 130, at 407.
133 Ernst, note 108, at 255; Seidman, note 103, at 36; see Peter Graham Fish, Red Jacket




III. THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT AND TEXAS & NEW ORLEANS
RAILROAD CO. V BROTHERHOOD OF RAILWAY CLERKS
The Court was not again confronted with the kinds of con-
stitutional issues presented in Adair and Coppage until Hughes had
returned to lead the Court in 1930, when Texas & New Orleans
Railroad Co. v Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks134 presented
the constitutionality of Section 2 of the Railway Labor Act of
1926.135 The pertinent provision stated: "Representatives, for the
purposes of this Act, shall be designated by the respective par-
ties ...without interference, influence or coercion exercised by
either party over the self-organization or designation of representa-
tives by the other."' 136 The Railroad had previously recognized the
Brotherhood, but had, in the wake of a dispute over wages, sought
to organize its own company union of railway clerks, and "endeav-
ored to intimidate members of the Brotherhood and to coerce them
to withdraw from it and to make [the company union] their repre-
sentative in dealing with the Railroad Company." '137 The district
court issued a temporary injunction ordering the Railroad and its
agents to cease "interfering with, influencing, intimidating, or co-
ercing" any of the clerks in their "free and untrammeled right of
self-organization." '138 The Railroad nevertheless proceeded to rec-
ognize the company union, and not the Brotherhood, as the legiti-
mate representative of its clerical employees. The district court
subsequently found the Railroad in contempt of its earlier order.
The Court directed the Railroad to purge itself of contempt by (1)
disestablishing the company union, (2) reinstating the Brotherhood
as the representative of its clerical employees, and (3) reinstating
certain employees who had been discharged by the Railroad for
participating in lawful union activities.139 The temporary injunc-
tion was subsequently made permanent, and a motion to vacate
'34 281 US 548 (1930).
'"44 Stat 577, ch 347.
136 Id.
17 281 US at 555.
338 The text of the temporary injunction is reproduced at 281 US at 555-56, n 1.
'; 281 US at 557.
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the order in the contempt proceedings was denied. 140 The Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the decree, and the Supreme Court
granted a writ of certiorari. 141
In the congressional debates over the Railway Labor Act, which
had set up a system for the voluntary arbitration of disputes be-
tween the railroads and their employees, Section 2 had been uncon-
troversial. Members of both Houses of Congress had repeatedly
justified the provisions of the bill by observing that railroads were
businesses affected with a public interest and that the public had
an interest in the continuous and uninterrupted flow of com-
merce. 14 2 Adair and Coppage had twice been cited in the context of
a debate over whether the ICC could constitutionally set aside a
wage agreement between a railroad and a union.143 No one, how-
ever, had suggested that those cases rendered Section 2 constitu-
tionally infirm.
Predictably, the brief for the Texas and New Orleans Railroad
did. The Railroad contended that all of its actions, including the
discharge of its employees, were constitutionally protected. Rely-
ing principally on Adair and Coppage, the Railroad asserted that its
agents144
had an inherent constitutional right even to make membership in
[the company union] a condition to the continuation of employment.
Certainly this includes the lesser right to peaceably, without
threats, influence employees to join [the company union], and
to recognize [the company union] as the only organization
through which they would confer and negotiate with their
employees .... [Tihe defendants had the constitutional right
to refuse to confer or negotiate with any organization at all,
which includes the right to confer and negotiate only in a partic-
ular manner.
'4 Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, et al. v Texas & N.O.R. Co. et al., 25 F2d
873 (SD Texas 1928); Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, et al. v Texas & N.O.R. Co.
et al., 25 F2d 876 (SD Texas 1928).
141 Texas & N.O.R. Co. et al. v Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks et al., 33 F2d 13
(5th Cir 1929); Texas & N. O.R. Co. et al. v Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks et at.,
280 US 550 (1929).
14' 67 Cong Rec 4507, 4519, 4648, 4669, 8815, 9048; S Rep 606 (69-1) at 2-3; H Rep 328
(69-1) at 6.
4 67 Cong Rec 8817, 8893.
144 Brief for the Petitioner at 86, Texas & N.O.R. Co., 281 US 548 (emphasis in original).
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The federal government, the Railroad contended, could not con-
stitutionally require an employer "to retain in his service an un-
wanted employee, or... to deal or not to deal with certain groups
of his employees.""14 Nor could the commerce power supply the
police power rationale for regulating the employer's constitutional
prerogatives. Railway labor organizations were not in 1930, any
more than they had been when Adair was decided, "so definitely
connected with interstate commerce that Congress may require the
employer to deal or not to deal with them in certain ways."'
146 "If
the evils existing in 1898 [the year of the Erdman Act's enactment]
after the great strike [the Pullman strike of 1894] were not sufficient
to authorize a much milder interference with the relations of em-
ployer and employee," argued the Railroad, "it is difficult to see
how conditions have so changed as to authorize an even greater
interference when conditions have changed, if at all, for the
better."'
147
On the brief for the Brotherhood was the Chicago-based attorney
for the Railway Employees' Department of the AFL, Donald
Richberg. Richberg, who would one day replace Hugh Johnson as
the head of the National Recovery Administration, was a co-author
of what would become the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and the princi-
pal architect of the Railway Labor Act.'48 Richberg's extensive
experience dealing with the constitutional dimensions of labor law
made him singularly qualified to defend the Act before the
Court.' 49
Richberg's principal task was to provide the analytic link that
the majority had found missing in Adair-the connection between
membership in a labor organization and interstate commerce.
Richberg's strategy was to recount the lessons learned during and
in the wake of World War I. In Wilson v New,'5 decided in 1917,
the Court had held that it was within the emergency war power
"I Id at 93.
146 Id.
141 Id at 93-94.
148 Ernst, note 108, at 267, 271-73; Peter Irons, note 4, at 29.
"I See Thomas E. Vadney, The Wayward Liberal: A Political Biography of Donald Richberg
(Univ Kentucky, 1970).
ISo 243 US 332 (1917).
264 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW
of the federal government to prescribe wages for railway employees
in a case in which a railroad and its employees' union could not
reach an agreement concerning wages. The Court had held that
the government might "exert the legislative will for the purpose of
settling the disputes, and bind both parties to the duty of accep-
tance and compliance, to the end that no individual dispute or
difference might bring ruin to the vast interests concerned in the
movement of interstate commerce." The government must have,
the Court had held, the "power to remedy a situation created by
a dispute between employers and employees as to rate of wages,
which, if not remedied, would leave the public helpless." The
extreme step of wage fixing had admittedly been taken in a time
of emergency which no longer obtained; but the Court had never-
theless recognized the impact that a dispute between management
and organized labor might exert on interstate commerce. 151
In the wake of World War I, Richberg noted, Congress had
enacted Title III of the Transportation Act of 1920. The Act had
created the Railroad Labor Board, which was designed to settle
labor-management disputes that threatened to interrupt interstate
commerce. The railway employees were to be represented before
the Board by representatives of their various labor organizations.
Therefore, argued Richberg, the Act had "created an imperative
legal recognition of a very definite legal connection between mem-
bership in a labor organization and the carrying on of interstate
commerce."
152
The Railway Labor Act similarly "expressed a public policy to
adopt as the means of preventing interruptions of interstate com-
merce, and therefore, as the means of a most necessary regulation
of interstate commerce, the encouragement of collective bargaining
between carriers and their employees. . . ." "Thus," concluded
Richberg, "the questioning of the majority opinion in the Adair
case-as to the 'legal or logical connection * * * between an em-
ployee's membership in a labor organization and the carrying on
of interstate commerce'-is completely answered. The connection
is now both legal and logical." ' 3
'~' Brief for the Respondent at 93-94, Texas & N.O.R. Co., 281 US 548.
152 Brief for the Respondent at 86-87, Texas & N.O.R. Co., 281 US 548. On the politics
and legislative history of the Transportation Act of 1920, see K. Austin Kerr, American
Railroad Politics, 1914-1920 (Univ Pittsburgh, 1968).
... Brief for the Respondent at 92-93, Texas & N.O.R. Co., 280 US 550.
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Having offered up the commercial police power rationale for the
regulation, Richberg next sought to minimize the law's intrusion
on the employer's liberty of contract, to emphasize its protection
of the employees' freedom of association, and to note the public
nature of the railroad's business. In making his argument, Richberg
glossed over the fact that the Railroad had been found in contempt
for discharging some of its union employees, and that in order to
have purged itself of contempt it would have been required to
reinstate them. Richberg rather contended that the Railway Labor
Act, unlike the Erdman Act, did not "make it a crime for an em-
ployer to hire whom he pleases, or discharge whom he pleases.
The Act does not attempt to limit his power of hiring or discharge.
The Act provides only that those who are his employees shall have
the right to designate their own representatives to negotiate with
him concerning terms and conditions of employment .... It must
be apparent that there is not in issue in the present case the basis
of the decision in the Adair case, that is, the right of the employer
to hire whom he pleases.
'"154
The "minor restraint here sought upon the employer's liberty of
contract,. 155 Richberg contended, ought to be indulged in order to
protect the fundamental rights of its employees. "[T]he right of
employees to associate themselves together (which is, of course, an
inherent right under our form of government), should be protected
as a 'legitimate object for the exercise of the police power.' ,156 And
why were the associational rights of these employees a fit subject
for the protection of the police power? Because "[r]ailway employ-
ees are 'charged by law' with public duties, and by Act of Congress
their organizations have been charged with most important public
duties."157
Richberg had now pressed all of the requisite analytic buttons.
The common law prerogatives of the employer were subject to
police power regulation because the business in which he was en-
gaged was affected with a public interest. The wartime experience
had made clear that the connection between labor-management
relations and interstate commerce was sufficiently close to provide
1S4 Id at 89-90 (emphasis in original).
15' Id at 101-2.
156 Id at 93.
157 Id (emphasis in original).
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the rationale for invocation of the commercial police power. And
with respect to such businesses affected with a public interest, the
legislature could constitutionally truncate the employer's common
law prerogatives in order to protect employees in their exercise of
legitimate rights of association.
A unanimous Supreme Court (Justice McReynolds did not par-
ticipate) thought that the constitutionality of the Act was not even
a close question.'58 "We entertain no doubt of the constitutional
authority of Congress to enact the prohibition," wrote Chief Justice
Charles Evans Hughes. Hughes gave short shrift to arguments
that had carried the day in Adair. Indeed, the dismissal of Adair's
contention that there was no nexus between membership in a labor
organization and the free flow of interstate commerce merited no
more than two sentences. "Congress," the Court held, "may facili-
tate the amicable settlement of disputes which threaten the service
of the necessary agencies of interstate transportation. In shaping
its legislation to this end, Congress was entitled to take cognizance
of actual conditions and to address itself to practicable mea-
sures."
159
The Court likewise demonstrated its willingness to take cogni-
zance of actual conditions. The Railroad's promotion and subsidy
of the company union and its discharge of the Brotherhood's lead-
ers, the Court found, constituted "interference, influence or co-
ercion" of its employees with respect to their rights to self-
organization. 160 Such terms were now held to mean "pressure, the
use of the authority or power of either party to induce action by
the other ... the abuse of relation or opportunity so as to corrupt
or override the will ... ,,161 Because the threat of lost employment
coerced the employees in their freedom to determine which (if any)
labor association they might wish to join, their decision to join the
company union could not be seen as a voluntary waiver of their
right to associate with some other organization. The Railroad was
"' The unanimity of the Court was readily obtained. Justice Van Devanter, who had
voted with the majority in Coppage, wrote Chief Justice Hughes that he considered the
opinion "as near perfect as is humanly possible." Pusey, 2 Charles Evans Hughes 713 (Macmil-
lan, 1951).
19 Texas & N. O.R. Co. et al. v Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks et al., 281 US
548, 570 (1930).
'60 Id at 560.
161 Id at 568.
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using its contractual prerogatives as a means of depriving its em-
ployees of their freedom of association. Because the decision to
join the company union was recharacterized as coerced rather than
voluntary, the resolution of the conflict between liberty of contract
and freedom of association effected by the Coppage majority was
no longer available. Having abandoned Pitney's voluntary waiver
theory, the Court would have to find some other reconciliation of
the conflict between contractual and associational liberty.
For the first time, the Court resolved the conflict in favor of
associational freedom. When these two competing liberal ideals of
liberalism came into conflict, the Court held, liberty of contract
would have to be recede so that freedom of association might be
preserved. Accordingly, the Court held, Section 2 of the Railway
Labor Act constituted a legitimate protection of employees' right
of free association.
1 62
The legality of collective action on the part of the employees
in order to safeguard their proper interests is not to be disputed.
It has long been recognized that employees are entitled to orga-
nize for the purpose of securing the redress of grievances and
to promote agreements with employers relating to rates of pay
and conditions of work. Congress was not required to ignore
this right of the employees but could safeguard it .... Thus
the prohibition by Congress of interference with the selection
of representatives for the purpose of negotiation and conference
between employers and employees, instead of being an invasion
of the constitutional right of either, was based on the recogni-
tion of the rights of both.
Such a characterization of the Court's reconciliation of the con-
flict of rights was less than forthcoming; and Hughes's prestidigital
performance was far from over. Glossing over, as had Richberg,
the fact that the district court's orders enforcing the Act had re-
quired the Railroad to reinstate employees it had discharged,
Hughes dismissed Adair and Coppage as "inapplicable."
163
The Railway Labor Act of 1926 does not interfere with the
normal exercise of the right of the carrier to select its employees
or to discharge them. The statute is not aimed at this right of
the employers but at the interference with the right of employ-
ees to have representatives of their own choosing. As the carri-
162 Id.
161 Id at 571.
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ers subject to the Act have no constitutional right to interfere
with the freedom of the employees in making their selections,
they cannot complain of the statute on constitutional grounds.
This was a distinction that could be remembered just long enough
to be stated once; 164 and there were at the time and have been since
several commentators who wondered whether, after 1930, there
was anything left of Adair and Coppage. 16s Just how much of those
cases was left, to which of the Justices, and for what reasons, would
not be clear until 1937.
IV. THE LUXURIATION OF THE AssOCIATIONAL RATIONALE
Congress was quickly alert to the possibilities offered by the
Texas & New Orleans case, and was sensitive to the associational
language employed in Hughes's opinion. 166 Section 3 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, enacted in 1932, declared that yellow-dog con-
tracts were contrary to the public policy of the United States and
would henceforth be unenforceable in the federal courts. 167 Mem-
bers of both Houses repeatedly invoked the authority of the Texas
& New Orleans case in support of this provision, and persistently
declared that yellow-dog contracts deprived employees of their
freedom of association. 16 8 "It would not be tolerated for a moment,"
argued Wisconsin Senator Blaine, echoing the words of Justice
164 Paul Freund, Charles Evans Hughes as ChiefJustice, 81 Harv L Rev 4, 35 (1967).
165 Seidman, note 103, at 35, n 109; Berman, The Supreme Court Interprets the Railway Labor
Act, 20 Am Econ Rev 619 (1930); Richard Cortner, The Jones & Laughlin Case 22 (Knopf,
1970); B. C. Gavit, The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution 231-33 (Principia,
1932); Thomas R. Fisher, Industrial Disputes and Federal Legislation 170, n 21 (New York,
1940); Comment, 37 W Va L Q 101 (1930); Comment, 40 Yale L J 92 (1930); Comment,
25 I11 L Rev 307 (1930); Samuel Hendel, Charles Evans Hughes and the Supreme Court 228, 260
(Kings Crown, 1951); see Fraenkel, Recent Statutes Affecting Labor Injunctions and Yellow Dog
Contracts, 30 Ill L Rev 854, 862, n 46 (1936). One commentator opined that the Texas &
New Orleans decision "would seem to bring [the Court] still closer to complete realization
that 'liberty to contract' may mean a liberty to join voluntary associations of workmen
unhindered by the 'yellow dog' contract." Comment, 81 U Pa L Rev 68, 73 (1932). For a
perceptive contemporary understanding of the limited implications of the Texas & New
Orleans decision, see Johns, The Validity of Federal Labor Legislation with Special Emphasis Upon
the National Labor Relations Act, 20 Marq L Rev 57, 70-71 (1936).
66 See Comment, 30 Ill L Rev 884, 904 (1936) (Texas & New Orleans decision "recognize[d]
the power of Congress to preserve the right of freedom of association of employees").
167 47 Stat 70, ch 90 (72-1).
168 75 Cong Rec 4503, 4504, 4626-28, 4677, 4762, 4917, 5463, 5469; S Rep 163 (72-1) at




Day's Coppage dissent, "if employers compelled all their employees
to sign contracts that they would not belong to some lodge or to
some particular church, or that they will vote the Republican
ticket .. ."169 But if employers could require employees to sign
yellow-dog contracts, argued Blaine, they could prevent their em-
ployees from "doing anything, either in or out of working hours,
that they do not like.'
170
The seriousness with which this associational rationale was taken
was reflected in a disagreement between the House and Senate
over the bill's declaration of policy. The version of the bill passed
by the House provided in part 7'
Sec. 2 .... Whereas... the individual unorganized worker is
commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to
protect his freedom of labor ...wherefore it is necessary
that he have full freedom of association [to organize and select
representatives, etc.]"
The Senate version of the bill's declaration of policy inserted, be-
tween "wherefore" and "it is necessary," the phrase, "though he
should be free to decline to associate with his fellows."' 172 The
House initially balked at the Senate's amendment; 17 but the Sen-
ate, whose members nearly unanimously supported the anti-
yellow-dog provision, insisted on its pristine formulation of the
worker's associational liberty. 74 In the final version of the bill, the
Senate's amendment prevailed. 7 ' As one commentator noted,
"[t]he freedom of association of workers and of employers alike is
held to be a necessity in order to foster freedom of contract."' 76
Senator Norris scored another victory for associational liberty
the following year when Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Act of
1933.'" Shortly before the close of the legislative session, Norris
169 75 Cong Rec 4628 (72-1).
170MI.
171 75 Cong Rec 5469 (72-1).
171 H Rep 821 (72-1) at 6.
" 75 Cong Rec 5720.
174 75 Cong Rec 5551.
175 47 Stat 70, ch 90 (72-1).
176 Comment, An Advance in Labor Legislation-The Anti-Injunction Act, 21 Geo L J 344,
345 (1933).
17 47 Stat 1467 (72-2), ch 204.
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succeeded in persuading the Senate to amend the House version
of the bill, adding what were to become Sections 77 (p) and (q).
178
Section 77 (p) provided:
179
No judge or trustee acting under this Act shall deny or in any
way question the right of employees on the property under his
jurisdiction to join the labor organization of their choice, and
it shall be unlawful for any judge, trustee or receiver to inter-
fere in any way with the organizations of employees, or to use
the funds of the railroad under his jurisdiction, in maintaining
so-called company unions, or to influence or coerce employees
in an effort to induce them to join or remain members of such
company unions.
Section 77 (q) provided: "No judge, trustee, or receiver acting un-
der this Act shall require any person seeking employment on the
property under his jurisdiction to sign any contract or agreement
promising to join or to refuse to join a labor organization," and
required the judge, trustee, or receiver in question to discard any
such contract in force before the subject property came under his
jurisdiction.
180
Defending his amendment on the Senate floor, Norris empha-
sized the fact that the worker's associational liberty would be
thereby preserved. "It [the amendment] permits rather than com-
pels men to join a so-called company union, to join whatever union
they want to that they shall be free men, and that they shall not
have that freedom taken away from them by any action of the
receiver or by any order of the court." 18' As Irving Bernstein noted,
Norris's amendment "outlawed both the yellow-dog contract and
the closed shop."'82 This symmetrical protection of workers' associ-
ational liberty was again embraced by the Emergency Railroad
Transportation Act of 1933, whose Section 7 (e) incorporated by
reference Sections 77 (p) and (q) of the Bankruptcy Act. 183
178 76 Cong Rec 5118-22 (72-2). The House agreed to the amendment at 76 Cong Rec
5360 (72-2).
179 47 Stat 1467, 1481 (72-2).
IS0 47 Stat 1467, 1481.
181 76 Cong Rec 5119 (72-2).
182 Bernstein, The New Deal Collective Bargaining Policy 44 (Univ California, 1950).
83 48 Stat 211, 214 (73-I), ch 91. See Bernstein, note 182, at 44-46. Norris and his
colleagues contemporaneously sought to protect workers' freedom of association through
Section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act ("NIRA"), the precursor of the Wagner
Act. Donald Richberg was again the principal author. R. W. Fleming, The Significance of the
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Similarly revealing were the debates over the 1934 amendments
to the Railway Labor Act. The amendments created a new Section
2, which set out the "general purposes" of the Act. Among these
purposes was "to forbid any limitation upon freedom of association
among employees or any denial, as a condition of employment or
otherwise, of the right of employees to join a labor organization.'
84
And indeed, the backers of the bill mobilized associational rhetoric
in its support. 185 But the House and Senate differed on the form
these associational protections should take. The original House bill
prohibited employers from influencing, coercing, or requiring their
employees to join company unions.186 The Senate version prohib-
ited employers from influencing, coercing, or requiring their em-
ployees to join any labor organization whatsoever.8 7 The Senate
again insisted on its symmetrical formulation, and the House, ade-
quately assured that the Senate's version prohibited company
unions, again capitulated.18 1 Once again, Congress had sought to
safeguard workers' associational liberty by outlawing both the yel-
low-dog contract and the closed shop. 189
Thus in four major pieces of legislation enacted in the early
1930s, Congress had evinced a preoccupation with symmetrical
protections for the worker's freedom of association. The employer
could not require the employee to agree not to join a union, nor
could he discharge him for joining one. Neither could the employer
seek to influence or coerce the employee into joining a company
union. Finally, the employer could not, at his employee's union's
Wagner Act, in Derber & Young, eds, Labor and the New Deal 126 (Da Capo, 1972). Section
7(a) required that every code of fair competition propounded pursuant to the NIRA provide:
(1) that employees be free to organize to bargain collectively free from employer interference
or coercion; and (2) "that no employee and no one seeking employment shall be required as
a condition of employment to join any company union or to refrain from joining, organizing,
or assisting a labor organization of his own choosing." 48 Stat 195, 198-99, ch 90 (73-1).
The Act's aberrationally permissive posture regarding the closed shop was in large measure
the quid pro quo for the AFL's acceptance of the trade association provisions sponsored by
the Chamber of Commerce. Irving Bernstein, The Turbulent Years 32 (Houghton Mifflin,
1969). With both business and organized labor happy to have more room to maneuver than
conventional antitrust law might have permitted, the freedom of non-union workers not to
associate with a labor organization got lost in the shuffle.
18 H Rep 1944 (73-2) at 5.
l H Rep 1944 (73-2) at 1-2; 78 Cong Rec 11717, 11720, 12553-12555.
' H Rep 1194 (73-2) at 6.
' 78 Cong Rec 12550.
188 78 Cong Rec 12553-12555.
"s Irving Bernstein, The Turbulent Years at 212 (cited in note 183).
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behest or otherwise, seek to influence or coerce any of his employ-
ees into joining a noncompany union. In the discrete areas of indus-
try covered by these acts, the asymmetry of the Coppage era ap-
peared to be rectified. With the passage of the Wagner Act the
next year, however, this preoccupation with symmetry would be
abandoned, and the asymmetry of the yellow-dog period would be
turned on its head.
V. VIRGINIAN RAILWAY CO. V SYSTEM FEDERATION, No. 40
The constitutionality of the amended Railway Labor Act
was attacked before the Court in 1937. The dispute arose over
attempts by the Railway to avoid collective bargaining with the
Federation, which was the duly accredited representative of the
Railway's mechanical department ("back-shop") employees. The
district court's decree had directed the Railway (1) to "treat with"
the Federation and to "exert every reasonable effort to make and
maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules and working
conditions . . ."; (2) not to enter into "any contract, undertaking,
or agreement of whatsoever kind concerning rules, rates of pay or
working conditions affecting its Mechanical Department employ-
ees, . . . except ... with the Federation"; and (3) not to interfere
with, influence, or coerce its employees with respect to their free
choice of representatives, nor, for such purposes, to organize or
foster any company union.190 As the Court's opinion noted, the
Railway did not argue that the third part of the district court's
order was unconstitutional. In view of the decision in the Texas &
New Orleans case, noted the Court, "[t]hat contention is not open
to it.
' 191
The Railway did, however, challenge the other two portions of
the lower court's order, and it did so on two fronts. The Railway
clearly could not claim that it was not a business affected with a
public interest-the business in which it was engaged was para-
digmatically public. But the Adair case had also involved a business
affected with a public interest, and the Railway could rely on the
absolutist language in which Justice Harlan had described the em-
ployer's liberty of contract. Glossing over the fact that the Railway
'9 Virginian Railway Co. v System Federation, No. 40, 300 US 515, 538-41 (1937).
'9' Id at 543-44.
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was engaged in a public business, attorney for the Railway James
Piper told the Court that "the freedom of contract argument is that
it is our right to refuse business negotiations with anyone." 192 The
Railway further argued that the back-shop employees were en-
gaged in the purely intrastate activities of repair and manufacture,
neither of which was sufficiently related to the interstate activities
of the Railway to admit of federal regulation. Because the activities
of the back-shop employees were beyond the reach of the federal
commerce power, the impact of those activities on interstate com-
merce could not supply the commercial police power rationale for
regulating the Railway's liberty of contract.
193
The Act and the lower court's decree were defended by the
Federation and by the United States, which filed a brief as amicus
curiae. "The Railway Labor Act," argued the brief for the Federa-
tion, "does not require a carrier to enter into any contract, but
merely that it shall negotiate with regard to the matter .... Negoti-
ations are not contracts, and in and of themselves cannot have the
effect of bringing into existence contractual rights or duties."'
1 94
"The petitioner is not placed under a duty to enter into a particular
agreement, to agree upon particular terms, or to make any contract
whatsoever," argued the brief for the United States. 19' "One who
confers, unlike one who contracts, is not bound as to any future
conduct. His future freedom is not thereby restrained.' 96
This much was true. But the defenders of the Act also had to
justify that portion of the lower court's order that had restrained
the Railway from entering into any contract concerning rates of
pay, rules, and conditions with anyone other that the Federation.
That portion of the decree, noted the brief for the United States,
did not restrain the Railway "in the normal exercise of its right to
select or discharge its employees."' 97 But to the extent that the
decree did impose limitations on the Railway's liberty of contract,
observed the Federation's brief, it was important to bear in mind
192 Arguments in Cases Arising Under Labor Acts Before the Supreme Court, Sen Doc 52 (75-1),
at 13-14 [hereinafter cited as Arguments].
"9 Brief for the Petitioner at 38-47, Virginian Railway Co., 300 US 515.
'9 Brief for the Respondent at 48-49, Virginian Railway Co., 300 US 515.
195 Brief for the United States at 82, Virginian Railway Co., 300 US 515 (emphasis in
original).
196 Id at 84.
Id at 89.
274 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW
that the Railway was "a common carrier, a public utility, the opera-
tor of a business peculiarly charged with the public interest. Its
business may, therefore, be regulated to a greater extend [sic] than
is the case with other industries without infringing upon the consti-
tutional guarantee of freedom of contract."'19
There remained only the task of articulating the police power
rationale for the regulation. The congressional power to regulate
commerce could reach the activities of back-shop employees, ar-
gued the brief for the United States, even though such employees
were not themselves engaged in interstate commerce. The Texas &
New Orleans case had upheld the validity of the Act as applied to
clerks, whose work was clearly intrastate in nature. A strike by the
Railway's back-shop employees would "both endanger the safety
of interstate transportation and directly obstruct its movement."
Moreover, any dispute between the Railway and its back-shop em-
ployees would likely be communicated to Railway employees en-
gaged in interstate commerce, thereby further threatening the con-
tinuity of interstate transportation.1" The purpose of the Act,
argued the Federation, was "to aid and encourage the railroads and
their employees to make and maintain agreements to the end that
labor strife and discontent be allayed and labor harmony and good
morale prevail; all to the end that there be no interruption of com-
merce in the public interest." '  The means employed by the Act
were, the Federation contended, reasonably related to that legiti-
mate end.2 1
The litigants were given a foreshadowing of the Court's decision
when Justice Sutherland interrupted the Railway counsel's free-
dom of contract argument to inquire, "[d]o you attach any impor-
tance to the fact that the railroad company is engaged in a business
charged with the public interest?"20 2 Piper's reply was a convoluted
"no," and counsel for both the Federation and the United States
were sure to emphasize the Railway's public nature in their presen-
tations.2"3 "Does the Fifth Amendment," asked counsel for the
198 Brief for the Respondent at 55-56, Virginian Railway Co., 300 US 515; see also id at
57, 63.
' Brief for the United States at 7, Virginian Railway Co., 300 US 515.
Zoo Brief for the Respondent at 52, Virginian Railway Co., 300 US 515.
201 Id.
202 Arguments, note 192, at 13.
203 Id at 32, 39-40.
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United States, "prevent the Congress from infringing somewhat
upon the absolute right to be perfectly free in the operation of your
business and in your dealings with your employees in order to
assure continuous operation of the railroad systems-a great public
necessity... ?"04 Citing Nebbia v New York2°. for the proposition
that due process requires "only that the law shall not be unreason-
able, arbitrary, or capricious, and that the means selected shall have
a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be obtained,"
counsel concluded that "the slight interference [here involved] with
the personal liberty of the railroad management . . . seems a very
minimum that they could be asked to relinquish in order that we
may bring about industrial peace."
20 6
The opinion of the Court, delivered March 29, was unanimous.
Employing again the analytical model initially embraced in Adair,
the Court noted that each of the doctrinal prerequisites to regula-
tion of the employment relationship had been satisfied. First, the
court noted, the business of the railroad was clearly affected with
a public interest. "More is involved," wrote Justice Stone, "than
the settlement of a private controversy without appreciable conse-
quences to the public. The peaceable settlement of labor controver-
sies, especially where they may impair the ability of an interstate
carrier to perform its service to the public, is a matter of public
concern."
20 7
The Court nevertheless sought to minimize the extent of the
intrusion on the employer's common law prerogatives. Neither the
Act nor the decree required the Railway to enter into any agree-
ment, held the Court-the Railway was merely required to "treat
with" the Federation, not to contract with it. 218 Moreover, the
portion of the decree restraining the Railway from entering into a
collective agreement with anyone other than the Federation did
not prevent the Railway from refusing to enter into any collective
contract and instead negotiating contracts with its employees on
an individual basis. 2 9 Because the provisions of the Act did not
"'interfere with the normal exercise of the right of the carrier to
204 Id at 39.
20 291 US 502 (1934).
206 Arguments, note 192, at 39-40.
207 Virginian Railway Co. v System Federation, No. 40, 300 US 515, 552 (1937).
208 Id at 557, 559.
209 Id at 548-49, 557, 559.
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select its employees or to discharge them,"' Adair and Coppage had
"no present application. "210
Finally, Justice Stone articulated the commercial police power
rationale undergirding the instant application of the Act. A strike
by the Railway's employees, he wrote, "if more than temporary,
would seriously cripple [the Railway's] interstate transporta-
tion. 2 11 The means prescribed by the Act were reasonably related
to the legitimate end of preventing such interruptions of commerce.
The Act was therefore a legitimate exercise of the federal govern-
ment's commercial police power.
2 12
VI. THE IMPACT OF NEBBIA V NEw YoRK
Early in 1934, before the enactment of either the Wagner
Act or the amendments to the Railway Labor Act, the Supreme
Court handed down a decision that would have profound repercus-
sions for liberty of contract jurisprudence. Yet Nebbia v New York2 "
did not concern any regulation of the employment relationship.
Instead, it involved a New York State Control Board regulation of
retail milk prices. The regulation was an attempt to ameliorate the
effects of cutthroat competition in the retail milk business, where
price-cutting had reduced the income of dairy farmers to a level
below the cost of production. Leo Nebbia, a retailer convicted of
selling milk below the price prescribed by State regulation, argued
that the regulation deprived him of property without due process
of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Price regulation,
Nebbia contended, was constitutional only as applied to a business
affected with a public interest. For a business to be affected with
a public interest, he argued, it had to be either a public utility or
a natural monopoly. Because neither Nebbia's business itself nor
the milk industry as a whole belonged to either of these categories,
Nebbia contended, his business was not affected with a public
interest and therefore was not subject to price regulation.
214
The Court, by a vote of five to four (the Four Horsemen-
210 Id at 559.
21, Id at 556.
2 Id at 553-57.
213 291 US 502 (1934).
214 Id at 531.
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directly and those that affected such commerce only indirectly. 217
Only activities that affected commerce "directly" were subject to
federal regulation. 218 Activities that affected interstate commerce
only "indirectly"-such as local sales, mining, agriculture, and
manufacturing-were subject only to state regulation. The Tenth
219Amendment forbade federal regulation of such activities.
However, if an otherwise "local" activity was deemed to be part
of a continuous "current" of interstate commerce, that activity
might be subjected to federal regulation. On the basis of this "cur-
rent of commerce" doctrine, the Supreme Court had upheld federal
statutes regulating transactions in the nation's major stockyards and
grain exchanges. 221 In each instance goods had been shipped from
one state to another, where they paused for a local activity, and
then moved on to yet another state. The pause for the local activity
was not deemed to break the "current" of interstate commerce of
which it was a part.
Justices committed to the maintenance of dual federalism 221 rec-
ognized that, in an economy becoming increasingly integrated on
a national scale, there was virtually no end to the list of business
activities that could be conceived as located in a current of interstate
commerce. If the traditional regulatory prerogatives of the states
were to be preserved, some means would have to be found to
restrict the scope of the current of commerce doctrine. The means
settled on by the Court was ingenious. Conflating the direct/indi-
rect distinction of commerce clause jurisprudence with the public/
private distinction of due process jurisprudence, the Court consis-
tently found that only businesses affected with a public interest
could be located in a federally regulable current of interstate com-
merce. A business affected with a public interest had the power to
affect commerce directly; a purely private business did not. The
current of commerce was thus conceived as a sequence of interstate
217 See Corwin, Commerce Power versus States Rights 189-208 (Princeton Univ, 1936).
2 See id at 198-208.
219 See id at 189-93; Carter v Carter Coal Co., 298 US 238 (1936); United States v Butler,
297 US 1 (1936).
20 Compare Swift & Co. v United States, 196 US 375 (1905); Stafford v Wallace, 258 US
495 (1922); Chicago Board of Trade v Olsen, 262 US 1 (1923); Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v United
States, 280 US 420 (1930) with Hopkins v United States, 171 US 578 (1898). See Cushman,
note 12.
... See Corwin, note 11, at ch 1.
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McReynolds, Sutherland, Van Devanter, and Butler-dissenting),
rejected Nebbia's contentions, and in so doing effectively retired
the distinction between public and private enterprise. "[T]here is
no closed class or category of businesses affected with a public
interest," wrote Justice Roberts for the majority. "The phrase,
'affected with a public interest' can, in the nature of things, mean
no more than that an industry, for adequate reason, is subject to
control for the public good."2 '
So far as the requirement of due process is concerned, and in
the absence of other constitutional restriction, a state is free to
adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to
promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legisla-
tion adapted to its purpose .... If the laws passed are seen to
have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and
are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of
due process are satisfied .... The Constitution does not secure
to anyone liberty to conduct his business in such fashion as to
inflict injury upon the public at large, or upon any substantial
group of the people. Price control, like any other form of regu-
lation, is unconstitutional only if arbitrary, discriminatory, or
demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free to
adopt ....
Nebbia's dismantling of the public/private distinction was a mile-
stone in American constitutional development, and its ramifications
for national collective bargaining legislation were twofold. First,
the category "business affected with a public interest" would no
longer operate as an independent constraint on legislative power to
regulate the employment relationship. So long as the legislation
was not patently arbitrary or capricious, the legislature could regu-
late the employment relations of any business, irrespective of
whether it had in the past been considered a business affected with
a public interest.
Second, due to an interdoctrinal relationship formed in the area
of commerce clause doctrine, Nebbia augmented the category of
enterprises whose employment relations might be deemed to affect
interstate commerce directly. From the late nineteenth century
through the mid-1930s, the Court had conscientiously maintained
a distinction between activities that affected interstate commerce
"I Id at 536.
216 Id at 537-39.
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business activities connected by intrastate business activities af-
fected with a public interest. As long as the class of businesses
affected with a public interest had remained small and select, the
channel cut by the current of commerce had remained narrow.
222
Nebbia, however, had thrown the class of businesses affected
with a public interest wide open. The internal logic of the current
of commerce doctrine thus impelled the Court toward recognition
of a broader conception of the current of commerce. Nebbia made
it possible to conceptualize what had previously been considered
purely private businesses as businesses affected with a public inter-
est. This in turn made it possible to locate such business activities
in a current of interstate commerce. These business activities could
now be seen to have the capacity to affect interstate commerce
directly. And because these businesses could now be seen as stand-
ing astride a current of interstate commerce, the impact that a
disruption in their labor relations might exert on the flow of that
current could provide the commercial police power rationale for
federal regulation of the employer's liberty of contract.223
The dissenting Four Horsemen, however, had balked at the
Court's abandonment of the formalist public/private distinction in
due process jurisprudence. As a corollary, they were not commit-
ted to the consequences Nebbia implied for current of commerce
jurisprudence. The intellectual structure of this Nebbian split
would be reflected in the pattern of decision in the Wagner Act
cases.
VII. THE WAGNER AcT CASES
Capping off the flurry of labor legislation enacted in the
1930s was the National Labor Relations Act, otherwise known as
the Wagner Act.224 Section 7 of the Act secured to employees "the
right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organiza-
tions, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection."
225
222 Cushman, note 12, at 114-24.
... Id at 130-31.
"1 49 Stat 449 (74-1), ch 372.
22 49 Stat 449, 452.
280 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW
Section 8 described certain "unfair labor practices" in which
employers were forbidden to engage. Sections 8(1) and 8(2) sought,
as had their statutory predecessors, to preserve workers' freedom
of association. Section 8(1) forbade the employer "to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed in section 7. ,226 Section 8(2) sought to preserve employer neu-
trality among unions and to outlaw company unions by forbidding
any employer "[t]o dominate or interfere with the formation or
administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or
other support to it. '227 Section 8(3) constituted a frontal assault on
Adair and Coppage, and a bet that the Texas & New Orleans case had
overruled them. Resurrecting in substance Section 10 of the Erd-
man Act, Section 8(3) forbade any employer "[b]y discrimination
in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition
of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any la-
bor organization. "228 Section 8 thus clearly proscribed the nemeses
of labor associationalism: anti-union discrimination in hiring and
firing, company unions, and yellow-dog contracts.229
In the hearings and debates on the bill, opponents relied heavily
on Adair and Coppage as precedents standing for the proposition
that Section 8 violated the Fourteenth Amendment.23 ° Proponents
of the bill, however, contended that those precedents were no
longer applicable. "The power of Congress to guarantee freedom
of organization, to prohibit the company-dominated union, and to
prevent employers from requiring membership or nonmembership
in any union has been upheld completely" in the Texas & New
Orleans case, declared Senator Wagner. "[iWe cannot doubt that




229 See Thomas R. Fisher, Industrial Disputes and Federal Legislation 273 (New York, 1940).
230 See, e.g., remarks of Sen. Hastings, 2 Legislative History of the National Labor Relations
Act 2403-11 (Government Printing Office, 1949) [hereinafter cited as NLRB, Legislative
History]; Statement ofJames A. Emery, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Education
and Labor on S 1958 (74-1) at 854, reprinted in NLRB, Legislative History at 2240.
231 Statement of Senator Wagner, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Education
and Labor on S 1958 (74-i) at 52-53, reprinted in NLRB, Legislative History at 1428-29. See
also S Rep 573 (74-1) at 17, reprinted in NLRB, Legislative History at 2317; remarks of Senator
Wagner, NLRB Legislative History at 2338; Statement of Professor Milton Handler, Hearing
of the Senate Committee on Education and Labor on S 1958 (74-1) at 233, reprinted in
NLRB, Legislative History at 1613.
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would show that Wagner's proclamation of Adair's demise was, if
not incorrect, at least exaggerated.
The Act's introductory "Findings and Policy" linked its commer-
cial police power rationale to the rhetoric of associational liberty. 
232
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who
do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of
contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or
other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and
affects the flow of commerce .... It is hereby declared to be
the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain
substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to
mitigate and eliminate those obstructions when they have oc-
curred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective
bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full
freedom of association....
In the floor debates, moreover, proponents defended the Act in
associational terms.2 33 But despite its evocation of associational
rhetoric, the Wagner Act did not embrace the symmetrical protec-
tions for workers' associational freedom provided by earlier labor
legislation. In the Senate debates on the bill, Senator Millard Tyd-
ings of Maryland sought to amend Section 7 to read: "Employees
shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec-
tion free from coercion or intimidation from any source."234 The notion
that workers ought to be entirely free from coercion in making
associational decisions was a logical outgrowth of the associational
paradigm embraced by Congress throughout the preceding decade;
and the supporters of the amendment mixed associational rhetoric
with citations to the Norris-LaGuardia Act in their remarks on the
floor. 235 "Is this not still the kind of country," Senator Tydings
asked, "where a man can select, without coercion or intimidation,
232 49 Stat 449, 450 (74-1), ch 372. See Comment, 30 Ill L Rev 884, 906 (1936) ("the
protection of employees in their right of freedom of association is reasonably calculated to
promote the amicable settlement of disputes").
233 See Irving Bernstein, The Turbulent Years at 332-33 (cited in note 183).
234 NLRB, Legislative History at 2357 (emphasis in original).
235 See remarks of Senators Tydings, Couzens, and Hastings, NLRB, Legislative History at
2357-96.
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the kind of organization to which he shall belong? ' 236 "A laborer
ought to be entitled without coercion from any side to say whether
he wants to join this, that, or the other union, and if it is wrong
for the employer, as it is wrong, to coerce labor or intimidate
labor, it is equally wrong for somebody else to coerce laborers and
intimidate them."237 Opponents of the amendment were hard put
to disagree with the logic of Tydings's arguments; but fearful that
judges hostile to labor might interpret "coercion" to include peace-
ful picketing and persuasion, even Senator Norris spoke against
it.238 The arguments of Wagner and Norris carried the day, and
the amendment was defeated by a vote of 50-21.239
The rejection of the Tydings amendment was not the only evi-
dence of the Senate's retreat from symmetrical associationalism.
Section 9(a) of the Act provided that the representative selected by
the majority of the employees in a unit would be the exclusive
representative of all unit employees in negotiating the terms of
employment: minority workers dissatisfied with the outcome of a
certification election could not designate their own representatives
to bargain on their behalf.240 President Roosevelt himself had re-
jected the principles of majority rule and exclusive representation
on the grounds that they interfered with freedom of association
when he had mediated the automobile industry settlement in
1934.241 Moreover, Section 8(3) broke with the policy of the Rail-
way Labor Act by adopting a permissive posture toward the closed
shop. The proviso to that section stipulated that "nothing in this
Act... shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with
a labor organization . . to require as a condition of employment
236 NLRB, Legislative History at 2359.
237 Id at 2361.
238 See remarks of Senator Norris, NLRB, Legislative History at 2380-87; see id at 2357-96
for the remarks of Senators Wagner, Barkley, and Walsh.
239 NLRB, Legislative History at 2399-2400. Tydings's amendment was rejected in the
House without debate, id at 3216, and was later rejected by the conference committee
despite the importunings of the Secretary of Commerce. Bernstein, note 182, at 127;
Cortner, The Wagner Act Cases 84 (Univ Tennessee, 1964).
240 49 Stat 449, 453. For Senator Hastings's unsuccessful associational objections to this
provision, see NLRB, Legislative History at 2361, 2389-93. See Blumberg, The National Labor
Relations Act: A Presentation of Some Constitutional and Economic Objections, 41 Com L J 136,
138 (1936); Chandler, The National Labor Relations Act; 22 ABA J 245, 250, 281-82 (1936);
Comment, 30 I11 L Rev 884, 919 (1936).
241 Irving Bernstein, The Turbulent Years at 184-85 (cited in note 183).
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membership therein... "'42 In the debates over the Tydings
amendment, Senator Daniel Hastings of Delaware condemned the
asymmetry of the Act's protections for workers' associational lib-
erty. The proviso, he argued, permitted "the reverse, as I under-
stand, of the 'yellow dog' contract which has been so roundly and
properly condemned in this body."243 "Does it not say, in so many
words, that if the employer so desires, and the majority of the
labor union so desires, they may make an agreement whereby no
one may be employed in the establishment unless he belongs to
that union, and will not that provision in this bill compel a minority
of employees in that particular shop or that particular unit to join
that union, whether they wish to or not, and pay all the fees which
the union may desire to charge?" 2" But advocates of the proviso
would not engage Hastings in associational terms. Associational
rhetoric had carried them as far toward their goals as it could. At
this juncture, the associational rationale was abandoned; as a result,
the asymmetry of the Coppage era was revived in inverted form.
The attorneys at the NLRB were aware that these provisions of
the Act did not square as neatly as had the Railway Labor Act
with the associational ideology expressed in the Texas & New Or-
leans opinion, and they crafted their litigation strategy accord-
ingly.2 41 Preparing to defend the constitutionality of the Wagner
Act before the Supreme Court, the NLRB lawyers sought out test
cases that would not bring before the Court these more problematic
provisions of the Act.24" Each of the test cases selected therefore
involved an instance in which an employer had been found guilty
of an unfair labor practice under Section 8(3) because it had dis-
charged one or more of its employees for engaging in legitimate
... 49 Stat 449, 452.
243 NLRB, Legislative History at 2394.
244 Id at 2395. Several members of the Senate also had misgivings toward the Act's imposi-
tion of the duty to bargain. In 1934, the Senate Committee on Education and Labor had
shelved Wagner's bill, S 2926, and had instead reported favorably a substitute bill introduced
by Senator David I. Walsh, Democrat of Massachusetts. "Walsh believed that the govern-
ment should only protect the civil right of association in a voluntary organization and that
Wagner had gone too far in urging affirmative encouragement of collective bargaining."
Bernstein, The Turbulent Years at 195 (cited in note 183).
245 James Gross, The Making of the National Labor Relation Board 187 (State Univ of NY,
1974).
246 Id
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union activities.247 Such cases cleanly presented instances in which
a worker's associational liberty had been compromised, and permit-
ted the NLRB attorneys to mobilize associational rhetoric with the
greatest effect.
The NLRB lawyers were also careful to select test cases in which
an employer's labor relations could be said to have a direct effect
on the flow of interstate commerce. Ultimately, they selected and
prepared five cases (the so-called "Wagner Act cases") through
which to test the constitutionality of the Act. The Washington,
Virginia & Maryland Coach Company was a small interstate transit
company. The Associated Press was a national wire service utiliz-
ing interstate channels of communication. In each of these two
cases, the nexus with interstate commerce was fairly clear. In addi-
tion to these cases, the NLRB also moved against three manufac-
turing operations: the Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation in Ali-
quippa, Pennsylvania; the Fruehauf Trailer Company in Detroit,
Michigan; and the Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Company in
Richmond, Virginia. In each of these manufacturing cases, the
plant in question acquired its raw and semifinished materials from
points outside its home state. After transforming these materials
into a finished product, each plant shipped the bulk of its products
to points outside its home state. These three cases had been care-
fully selected because they could be argued as current of commerce
cases; and, indeed, the NLRB lawyers briefed and argued the cases
under that theory. 248
The Wagner Act cases249 were argued at the same time as the
Virginian Railway case. The Washington, Virginia & Maryland
Coach Company was admittedly a common carrier engaged in in-
terstate commerce. Apparently recognizing that the Texas & New
Orleans case was controlling, the company offered only a token due
process argument. 2"° None of the other businesses was so para-
247 Id.
248 For a detailed discussion of the case selection, briefing, arguing, and resolution of the
commerce clause issues in the Wagner Act cases, see Cushman, note 12, at 139-56; Irons,
note 4, at ch I 1-13.
249 NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 US 1 (1937); NLRB v Fruehauf Trailer Co.,
301 US 49 (1937); NLRB v Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 US 58 (1937); Associated
Press Co. v NLRB, 301 US 103 (1937); Washington, Virginia & Maryland Coach Co. v NLRB,
301 US 142 (1937).




digmatically public, however, and each emphasized its essentially
private nature in its briefs and arguments. The Texas & New Orleans
case, argued counsel for Jones & Laughlin, was distinguishable
from the instant case because the former involved "an interstate
carrier, which is a public utility." '251 Congress possessed broad
powers to regulate the employment practices of such enterprises.
Jones & Laughlin, however, was not a business affected with a
public interest, and Congress was therefore without authority to
regulate its common law prerogatives.
25 2
The Texas & New Orleans case, contended counsel for the Fried-
man-Harry Marks Clothing Company, could not "be cited in any
way as authority for the proposition that the Federal Government
may place any limitation upon the right of an employer conducting
a private business, to hire and fire with impunity.. ,253 The Rail-
way Labor Act, the company argued,25 4
applied only to common carriers engaged in the transportation
of commerce between the several states, whose businesses are
affected with a great national public interest .... (This differ-
ence is of the greatest significance and importance in a consider-
ation of the National Labor Relations Act, which is applicable
to inherently intrastate enterprises affected with no public in-
terest, the internal regulation and continuance of which is ad-
mittedly of only private concern.)
John W. Davis, arguing on behalf of the Associated Press, con-
tended that "regulation of the right to contract in respect of a
private business, is arbitrary and therefore void unless confined to
the exigencies of a real emergency.""2 ' The Wagner Act did "not
even pretend to establish or follow a distinction between public
and private business, [or] between public and private employ-
ment .. ."26 On the contrary, the Act outlawed "all private and
individual bargaining in respect of private enterprise in private
industry. ' 257 The Act as applied to the Associated Press was "an
25 Brief for the Respondent at 33, Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 US 1.
252 Id at 33, 112, 116-17.
253 Brief for Respondent at 68, Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 US 58 (emphasis
in original).
"I Id at 68-69.
'55 Brief for the Petitioner at 68, Associated Press Co., 301 US 103.
116 Id at 70.
257 Id.
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invasion of freedom of contract between an employer and an em-
ployee who are engaged in a wholly private occupation.
'" 258
The Act's defenders responded, of course, by mobilizing Nebbia
v New York. The distinction between public and private business
was no longer pertinent, and the strand of due process doctrine
from which that distinction had emerged no longer constituted a
restraint on the exercise of governmental regulatory power. "The
Fifth Amendment," argued the attorneys for the NLRB, "serves
to invalidate legislation only so far as 'the means selected' are 'un-
reasonable, arbitrary or capricious', and have no 'real and substan-
tial relation to the object sought to be attained' [citing Nebbia].
259
The AFL cited Nebbia to the same effect in its amicus brief in
Washington, Virginia & Maryland Coach Co.260 The purpose of the
Act, argued Solicitor General Stanley Reed, was to prevent inter-
ruptions to the free flow of interstate commerce caused by labor
disputes, and the means selected by the Act to achieve this end
were "reasonable and proper in their character." 261' The due process
issue was accordingly completely controlled by the Texas & New
Orleans case.
262
The NLRB attorneys also mobilized associational rhetoric in
defense of the Act. The Labor Board's brief in the Associated Press
case contended that "the protection of employees in their freedom
of association has been for a long time a recognized and fundamen-
tal part of the policy of the Federal Government in all aspects of
labor relations subject to its control or legislative authority, and
has been approved as just and reasonable. '" 263 The amicus brief
filed by the American Newspaper Guild in the Associated Press case
crystallized the defense of the Act in a single statement: "in the
public interest, it is essential to enforce freedom of association for
the purpose of negotiating the terms upon which labor is willing
258 Arguments, note 192, at 67.
259 Brief for the Respondent at 89, Associated Press Co., 301 US 103.
26' Brief of the American Federation of Labor, Amicus Curiae, at 15-16, Wasbington,
Virginia & Maryland Coach Co., 301 US 142.
261 Arguments, note 192, at 130-31.
262 Id at 129.
263 Brief for Respondent at 96, Associated Press Co., 301 US 103; see also id at 93, 99-100;
Arguments, note 192, at 86, 89.
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to sell its services to the end that there may be peace instead of
war in matters affecting interstate commerce."
264
The opinion in the Washington, Virginia & Maryland Coach case
was, predictably, unanimous. The company was a common carrier
engaged in interstate transportation, and its common law employ-
ment prerogatives were, like those of the Texas & New Orleans
Railroad and the Virginian Railway, subject to reasonable regula-
tion in the public interest. In the remaining cases, however, the
Justices split 5-4 on the due process issue. The rationales for each
position were stated in the Jones & Laughlin majority opinion and
dissent. 65
The principal issue before the Court was whether the labor rela-
tions of the enterprises in question were sufficiently related to the
free flow of interstate commerce to warrant federal regulation un-
der the commerce power. In the course of resolving this issue, the
opinion of Chief Justice Hughes outlined the commercial po-
lice power rationale justifying the statute's intrusion upon the
employer's common law prerogatives. The stoppage of Jones &
Laughlin manufacturing operations "by industrial strife," wrote
Hughes,
266
would have a most serious effect on interstate commerce. In
view of respondent's far-flung activities, it is idle to say that
the effect would be indirect or remote. It is obvious that it
would be immediate and might be catastrophic. . . . When
industries organize themselves on a national scale, making their
relation to interstate commerce the dominant factor in their
activities, how can it be maintained that their industrial labor
264 Brief of the American Newspaper Guild, Amicus Curiae, at 22, Associated Press Co.,
301 US 103.
265 The majority opinions in the Fruehauf and Friedman-Harry Mark cases simply recited
the facts and summarily sustained the application of the Act on the authority of the Jones
& Laughlin decision. 301 US 49 (1937); 301 U.S. 58 (1937). The Four Horsemen offered a
single consolidated dissent from the three manufacturing cases. 301 US at 76. Justice Roberts
wrote the majority opinion in the Associated Press case, in which he summarily rebuffed due
process objections, citingJones & Laughlin and the Texas & New Orleans case. 301 US 103,
133 (1937). The Four Horsemen, having offered their liberty of contract objections to the
Act in their consolidated dissent from the manufacturing cases, confined themselves to
dissenting from Roberts's opinion on the ground that the application of the Act to the
Associated Press violated the First Amendment. 301 US at 133.
"6Jones & Laughlin, 301 US at 41. For a detailed discussion of the commerce clause
dimensions of Hughes's opinion, see Cushman, note 12, at 146-55.
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relations constitute a forbidden field into which Congress may
not enter when it is necessary to protect interstate commerce
from the paralyzing consequences of industrial war?
Revealing the extent to which the wartime experience had exposed
the Adair Court's naivete, Hughes concluded:
2 67
Experience has abundantly demonstrated that the recognition
of the right of employees to self-organization and to have repre-
sentatives of their own choosing for the purpose of collective
bargaining is often an essential condition of industrial peace.
Refusal to confer and negotiate has been one of the most prolific
causes of strife. This is such an outstanding fact in the history
of labor disturbances that it is a proper subject of judicial notice
and requires no citation of instances.
Hughes's opinion also drew extensively on the associational
rhetoric he had employed seven years earlier. Citing Texas & New
Orleans and Virginian Railway, Hughes held that the Act merely
secured
268
a fundamental right. Employees have as clear a right to organize
and select their representatives as the respondent has to orga-
nize its business and select its own officers and agents. Discrim-
ination and coercion to prevent the free exercise of [those em-
ployee rights] is a proper subject for condemnation by
competent legislative authority.
The Texas & New Orleans decision had clearly established that an
employer's discriminatory discharge of employees constituted a co-
ercive interference with its employees' rights of association. And
with the decision in Nebbia, it was clear that the Fifth Amendment
did not limit governmental power to safeguard those rights from
such coercion. Deploying the post-Nebbia language of due process,
the Court found that restraint of the employer's common law pre-
rogatives "for the purpose of preventing an unjust interference with
that right cannot be considered arbitrary or capricious. 26 9 In the
conflict between liberty of contract and freedom of association, the
Court had again awarded victory to the latter.
Yet as it had in Texas & New Orleans and Virginian Railway, the
267 301 US at 42.
26 Id at 33.
269 Id at 44.
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Court minimized the Act's imposition on the employer's contrac-
tual liberty. The Act, wrote Hughes,
2 70
imposes upon the respondent only the duty of conferring and
negotiating with the authorized representatives of its employees
for the purpose of settling a labor dispute .... The Act does
not compel agreements between employers and employees. It
does not compel any agreement whatever. It does not prevent
the employer 'from refusing to make a collective contract and
hiring individuals on whatever terms' the employer 'may by
unilateral action determine.' [citing Virginian Railway].
Accordingly, Adair and Coppage were again "inapplicable." The
Act did not
271
interfere with the normal exercise of the right of the employer
to select its employees or to discharge them. The employer
may not, under cover of that right, intimidate or coerce its
employees with respect to their self-organization and represen-
tation, and, on the other hand, the Board is not entitled to
make its authority a pretext for interference with the right of
discharge when that right is exercised for other reasons than
such intimidation and coercion.
It was by now quite clear that "inapplicable" was a highly euphe-
mistic way of describing the status of Adair. Adair and Coppage
had embraced a thoroughgoing liberty of contract unchecked by a
countervailing right to free association. The voluntary waiver the-
ory of the Coppage Court had elided the conflict between these two
liberal rights; and thiselision was possible only against a backdrop
of assumptions about the employment relationship that the Court
no longer entertained. Changes in the structure of the labor market
undoubtedly informed the Court's concept of coercion. But it is
important to recognize that the distance from Adair to the Wagner
Act cases was traversed within a framework of liberal rights dis-
course. Liberty of contract had not simply been abandoned as un-
worthy or anachronistic. It had instead been curtailed in order to
safeguard the countervailing liberal right of free association.
72
270 Id at 44-45.
271 Id at 45-46.
272 See Corwin, note 5, at 124-25; Corwin, ConstitutionalRevolution, Ltd. 66-67, 79 (Clare-
mont, 1941); Samuel Hendel, note 165, at 260; Virginia Wood, Due Process of Law, 1932-1949
160-61 (Kennikat, 1951).
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The Four Horsemen were not prepared to accept this accommo-
dation in the three manufacturing cases, and we cannot understand
their reasons for doing so without attention to doctrinal detail. Like
the majority, the dissenters continued to work within the analytical
model fashioned in Adair. Unlike the majority, however, the dis-
senting Justices did not see that model as having been modified by
Nebbia. Having dissented in Nebbia, the dissenters disagreed with
the majority over the types of situations into which the federal
government might project its authority in order to adjust the com-
peting claims of contractual and associational freedom. The Four
Horsemen thought that Congress might legitimately so project its
authority in cases involving both a business affected with a public
interest (as that concept had been understood before Nebbia) and a
commercial police power rationale-this much the cases involving
interstate common carriers made clear. 73 But in the absence of
these two factors, Congress was in their view powerless to inter-
vene in the competition. Thus, despite their concurrences in the
Texas & New Orleans, Virginian Railway, and Washington, Virginia
& Maryland Coach cases, the dissenters believed that Adair and
Coppage still retained some vitality.
Justice McReynolds's lengthy discussion of the commerce power
issue certainly would have sufficed as a front for a dissent motivated
by crude anti-labor sentiment. Yet the dissenters went on in a
separate section to condemn the application of the Wagner Act to
the three manufacturing establishments as a violation of the Fifth
Amendment. The manner in which they did so is eloquent testi-
mony to the continuing vitality the Adair model held for them, and
to the extent to which they continued to embrace pre-Nebbian no-
tions of public and private.
As far as the Four Horsemen were concerned, the Texas & New
Orleans case was "not controlling." '274 There, Justice McReynolds
wrote, the Court had been considering "an act definitely limited to
common carriers engaged in interstate transportation over whose
affairs Congress admittedly has wide power .. .""' That case
had clearly dealt with a pre-Nebbia business affected with a public
273 Washington, Virginia & Maryland Coach Co. v NLRB, 301 US 142 (1937); Virginian
Railway Co. v System Federation, No. 40, 300 US 515 (1937); Texas & New Orleans Railroad
Co. v Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, 281 US 548 (1930).




interest and an obvious commercial police power rationale. In the
instant cases, however, the dissenters were not satisfied that the
activities of the enterprises in question could directly affect inter-
state commerce. Because they viewed those enterprises as purely
private businesses not affected with a public interest, the Four
Horsemen could not accept the current of commerce theory urged
by the government.276 Nor could they see any other theory under
which the enterprises in question were anything other than simply
local manufacturing operations immune from federal regulation.
2 77
Accordingly, the impact of those employers' labor relations on in-
terstate commerce could not provide the necessary rationale for
federal police power regulation of contractual liberty.
Moreover, the businesses in which the various enterprises were
engaged were not, the dissenters believed, affected with a pub-
lic interest. Accordingly, the common law prerogatives of those
employers to hire and fire at will were not subject to legisla-
tive abridgement. Citing Adair and Coppage, Justice McReynolds
opined:
2 78
The right to contract is fundamental and includes the privilege
of selecting those with whom one is willing to assume contrac-
tual relations. This right is unduly abridged by the Act now
upheld. A private owner is deprived of power to manage his
own property by freely selecting those to whom his manufac-
turing operations are to be entrusted. We think this cannot
lawfully be done in circumstances like those here disclosed.
The disagreement between the majority and the dissent over
whether the Wagner Act violated the Fifth Amendment thus was
a disagreement over two basic issues. First, whether the labor rela-
tions of the employers directly affected interstate commerce (the
commercial police power issue); and, second, whether the busi-
nesses in which the enterprises were engaged were affected with a
public interest. The disagreement over this first issue was essen-
tially the disagreement expressed by the two sets of Justices in
Nebbia v New York. 279 The controversy over the second issue was
... Friedman-Harry Marks Clotbing Co., 301 U.S. at 97-99, 103. See Cushman, note 12,
at 154-55.
277 See Cushman, note 12, at 154-55.
... Friedman-Harry Marks Clotbing Co., 301 US at 103.
279 See Cushman, note 12, at 146-56.
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likewise comprehended within that same Nebbian fracas. Thus,
the fundamental issues that would divide the Justices in the seminal
labor cases of modern American constitutional law were decided
not in response to the political pressures of 1937,280 but in a 1934
dispute over the price of milk in upstate New York.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In preparing to defend the Wagner Act, the NLRB attor-
neys had been forced to select their test cases and legal arguments
with close attention to doctrinal detail. The Court's commerce
clause jurisprudence counseled them that only businesses whose
labor relations exerted a "direct" effect on interstate commerce
would fall under the federal government's commercial police
power. As the Four Horsemen were replaced with Roosevelt ap-
pointees, however, it appeared that the Court was taking a broader
view of the federal power to regulate commerce. The Court's 1941
decision in United States v Darby2"' marked a significant step in this
progression; with the decision in Wickard v Filburn282 the following
year, the federal commerce power became virtually plenary. Taken
in conjunction with the Court's decision in Nebbia, this expansion
of the commercial police power made it clear that Adair's analytical
model had dissolved. In 1941, Hughes's final year on the Court,
Justice Frankfurter stated what must have been obvious to all. "The
course of decisions in this Court since Adair v. United States and
Coppage v. Kansas," he wrote, "have completely sapped those cases
of their authority."
283
As the ultimate expositor of the Wagner Act, the Court would
continue to define the extent of the Act's associational and contrac-
tual protections. The fundamental right of association was secure,
but the legitimate concerted activities of labor associations were
not without limits. 84 Similarly, the abandonment of Adair and
280 See Cushman, note 6.
281 312 US 100 (1941).
282 317 US Ill (1942).
283 Phelps-Dodge Corp. v NLRB, 313 US 177, 187 (1941) (citations omitted).
284 See Karl Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal
Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 Minn L Rev 265, 318-25 (1978); Nowak, Rotunda & Young,
note 8, at 967-69.
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Coppage did not signal a loss of all solicitude for employers' contrac-
tual prerogatives. 8 The Court's constitutional accommodation be-
tween associational and contractual rights had taken place within
a framework of liberal rights discourse, and the terms of that dis-
course would continue to inform its construction of the statute.
After 1937, however, the extent of the Court's protection of those
rights was no longer a matter beyond congressional control. The
constitutional revolution in labor law had been consolidated.
It is a commonplace that the Hughes Court era was the period
during which the Supreme Court receded from its traditional solici-
tude for economic liberty and began to turn its attention instead
to noneconomic forms of civil liberty. Yet the story is convention-
ally told as if the two forms of liberty were merely ships passing
in the night: one on the ascendant, the other in decline.286 In the
context of the yellow-dog contract, however, the more appropriate
image was the face-off. Assimilating unionism to other forms of
voluntary association, labor's advocates successfully brought lib-
erty of contract into a face-to-face conflict with freedom of associa-
tion. Prefiguring and exemplifying the jurisprudential transforma-
tions for which it would become known, the Hughes Court from its
inception consistently resolved this conflict in favor of associational
liberty. The tale of the yellow dog thus was not just a sideshow in
the demise of "laissez-faire" constitutionalism. It was emblematic
of the Hughes Court's pivotal role in the recasting of American
liberalism.
285 Klare, supra at 293-310.
2'6 For a discussion of historians' assessment of the Hughes Court, see Parrish, The Hughes
Court, the Great Depression, and the Historians, 40 The Historian 286 (1978).

